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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a comprehensive interpretation of European political history
in the periodization from 2008 to 2016. The history begins with an exploration of
the intellectual and political origins of the post-World War II project of European
integration and the development of, and opposition to, the early institutions that
eventually formed the contemporary assemblage of the European Union.
Following a traditionally structured history, this work is styled as a ‘history of the
present’ that specifies the role of the European Union in precipitating and
attempting to overcome the financial and monetary crises, foreign policy
quandaries on its Eastern periphery, an unmanageable escalation in migration
rates, and the materialization of Eurosceptic, populist, and anti-establishment
political actors at European and national levels. The specific arrangement of this
thesis intends to fulfill its ultimate purpose of identifying the dynamic
circumstances that aided the outcome of the United Kingdom referendum to
leave the European Union.
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CHAPTER ONE:
THE CONVERGENCE OF POSTWAR EUROPE
The war that came to an end in 1945 was the costliest war in human
history and dwarfed all previous military engagements. World War II took millions
of lives and destroyed much of Europe’s civilian infrastructure in less than six
years – it was mostly a war of occupation; a civilian experience.1 Despite the
massive losses and widespread destruction, the war rearranged and transformed
the international political order. Loosely speaking, the war represented an
ideological battle between liberalism, communism, and fascism. The fascist
element was buried at the end of World War II and seemingly overnight a hostile
nuclear standoff developed between liberalism and communism, or the United
States and Soviet Union. Thus, the year 1945 is only a relative watershed
moment.2 While half of Europe enjoyed a recovery unparalleled in human history,
the other continued to suffer in the psychological, political, and economic chains
of Soviet communism.
What was to come of Europe after the war? Nazi Germany and their
collaborators wiped the European continent clean of the weak governments and
political systems that existed in the interwar years. While World War I only had
the significant consequence of ridding Europe of old dynastic empires, World

1. Estimating the amount of lives lost is a difficult task due to the sheer scale of the conflict. Every
major world power was involved, including their colonies and overseas possessions. In Postwar:
A History of Europe Since 1945, Tony Judt gave the estimate for Europeans alone at 36.5 million
lives, a “staggering” number as he stated it, even if conservative.
2. Tony Judt, "Nineteen Eighty-Nine: The End of Which European Era?" Daedalus 123, no. 3
(1994): 1-19.
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War II and its aftermath directly displaced and reorganized entire populations of
differing peoples.3 Soviet ‘resettlement’ of the quite large German population
outside of Germany was particularly the most brutal. The end of the war assisted
in the implementation of the borders and nations that exist in the present day.
The Allied occupation of Germany positioned itself as the most substantial
issue after the war and the most symbolic location of ground zero for the Cold
War. Originally intended to suppress any attempt to reignite the war and to
facilitate the process of denazification, the occupation became a point of
contention not just between the occupiers and their respective zones but
between the occupiers themselves – the United States, Britain, France, and
Soviet Union. In what has been articulated first by German poet Hans Magnus
Enzenberger and repeated later by British historian Tony Judt, a “collective
amnesia” swept Europe.4 It was obvious for the major powers that the new
geopolitical situation was going to be a fight for influence in Central Europe. As
1945 drifted further away, the reconstruction and influence in Europe took priority
over any repercussions for wartime grievances.
The most significant political figure in Germany of the postwar years was
Konrad Adenauer, a former mayor of Cologne who was imprisoned several times
during Nazi regime and after the war held a contemptuous attitude toward the
continued occupation of Germany. He founded the Christian Democratic Union, a

3. Donald Bloxham, The Final Solution: A Genocide, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009),
92-130.
4. Judt, Postwar, 60-61.
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political party that aimed to rebuild German politics after the war and restore
German sovereignty. By 1949, the Allied forces in the Western portion of
Germany (Americans, British, and French) had all withdrawn from their zones in
Germany except for the French protectorate in the Saar region.5 Adenauer saw
that the path toward shedding the Nazi label for the newly established Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) was cooperation and involvement in the
international arena. Balance of power defined the continent for centuries,
especially between France and Germany. Thus, from the perspective of
Adenauer, there was nothing to lose and everything to gain from fostering
positive relations with France and other European nations. Early in the postwar
years, Adenauer understood the need for a Franco-German rendezvous to
oppose the control of outside influencers.

Toward A Unified Europe
The concept of a unified continent is not unique to postwar Europe.
Empires have had their generous share of European history, first with the
incredible full extent of the Mediterranean society built by the Roman Empire in
late antiquity. The spread of Christianity by the Romans is noteworthy in and of
itself in subsequently unifying the peoples of Europe for hundreds of years, albeit
the with repeated schisms into religious denominations and holy domains.
Potentially the most ignored example among historians of European integration is

5. The Saar protectorate was ceded to the Federal Republic of Germany in 1957.
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the ambiguous Holy Roman Empire. Its system of imperial governance made it
distinct from the rest of Europe. It bound itself together using a flexible legal
structure and ‘progressive fragmentation’ of its complex hierarchy. Most
importantly, the Empire was in part responsible for building the modern
conception of Westphalian sovereignty.6 It is no accident that a political invention
like sovereignty emerged from the Thirty Years’ War, the bloodiest armed conflict
of the medieval era comparable to the two World Wars.7 French general and
statesman Charles de Gaulle himself referred to the 20th century skirmishes with
the Germans as a second thirty-years’ war, of course in his strict adherence to
nationalist language (and at the same time participating in collective amnesia by
failing to mention the existence of Vichy collaborators):
The tragedy of the thirty-year war, which we have just won, has involved
many adventures and saw many actors come and go. We French are
among those who always remained on the stage and never changed
sides. Circumstances may have compelled us to vary our tactics,
sometimes in the light of the battlefields, sometimes in the night of the
clandestine. But we only have one kind of veteran. Those of us who, in the
past, attacked the Marne, the Yser, or the Vardar, differed in no wise from
those who, yesterday, clung to the Somme, bent on Bir-Hakeim, took
Rome, defended the Vercors or liberated Alsace. The painful victims of the
martyred villages of the valley of Saulx fell for the same cause as the
glorious soldiers buried at Douaumont. What would have been the
character and outcome of this war if, from the first to the last day, she had
been French at the same time as worldly? What would peace be tomorrow
if it were not to be the peace of France as well as that of others?8

6. Peter H. Wilson. "The First European Union," History Today 66, no. 4 (2016): 10-19.
7. See this perspective on World War I and II in Michael Howard’s “A Thirty Years’ War?” and Ian
Kershaw’s “Europe’s Second Thirty Years War.”
8. Charles de Gaulle, Speech at Bar-le-Duc, 28 July 1946, Digithèque de Matériaux Juridiques et
Politiques, University of Perpignan.
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De Gaulle’s resentment toward the Germans defined most of that speech. Not
long after the war, de Gaulle’s sentiments were never fully realized in postwar
politics, but he will surface as a key figure in restraining the lofty goals of the
European project in the 1960s. Nevertheless, European affairs (in the West, at
the very least) differed significantly from the past in that building the economy
took priority over punishing the losers of war. The French found it more important
to revive its industries and remain as a key player in postwar international affairs
– which also happened to interact with the postwar goals of the Germans. The
Americans, in conjunction with the British, desired to maintain a strong and
economically prosperous Western Europe backed by the safety guarantees of
NATO.
One modern-day conception of European integration came immediately
after World War I by means of the Paneuropean Union association. Established
in 1923 and led by its President, Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, its stated goal
was to advocate for a liberal and democratic European state. The loose
association of intellectuals, artists, and other public figures of the time gave
support for this idealist vision during the interwar years. These sentiments were
written in Kalergi’s manifesto, aptly titled Pan-Europe.9 This movement was
temporarily stalled by the rise of Hitler and Stalin, and as the continent focused
more on the economic turmoil caused by the Great Depression. Hitler banned the
organization in Germany and most intellectuals dropped their support in favor of

9. Richard Nicolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1926).
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the Soviet Union. While this organization held a minor status after World War II,
many of its vague, primitive concepts were incorporated into the foundation of the
Council of Europe in 1949.10
European associations advocating for unity, or at the very least against
war, came and went in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
However, the most noteworthy of these came in Mussolini’s Italy with the
founding of the Movimento Federalista Europeo (MFE, translated as European
Federalist Movement) by Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi, and Eugenio Colormi.
The historically interesting Ventotene Manifesto, named after the prison island
they were being held for political reasons, was crudely drafted in 1941 by these
three men.11 After the overthrow of Mussolini in 1943, they were released and
continued their federalist activism within the ranks of the Resistenza. Rossi and
Colormi were killed by the Nazis in 1944, leaving Spinelli to be the most
prominent federalist voice remaining from the group. Spinelli worked as a
campaigner for European federalism after World War II, often interacting with
Democrazia Cristiana (DC, translated as Christian Democracy) led by Alcide de
Gasperi.12 Spinelli, a former communist, believed that only integration of

10. The present-day organization has a website with information on their history and present-day
activities. Last accessed December 20, 2018 at: http://www.international-paneuropean-union.eu
11. Charles F. Delzell, "The European Federalist Movement in Italy: First Phase, 1918-1947,"
Journal of Modern History 32, no. 3 (1960): 243.
12. Many of the founders and advocates of European integration among the likes of de Gasperi
and Adenauer were Christian Democrats. This group of political parties that emerged after World
War II reconciled differences between Catholics and Protestants as well as ideological
differences between the left and right. Christian Democrats were responsible for establishing
prosperous social market economies in postwar Europe.
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European defense and the economy in a federal structure would be able to stave
off the intrusion of Stalin and his communist allies. While the spirit of his ideas
was incorporated into the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) and European Economic Community (EEC), his desires of full-fledged
federalism, including defense and political communities and common currency,
would not be realized in his lifetime.
These movements were not powerful in the sense that they had a huge
hand in the actual execution of integration – they were only idealists at best.
While their ideas did not fall on deaf ears, the trajectory of European integration
was completely open-ended for much of the twentieth century. There was
certainly a sense of urgency to do something to take control of European affairs,
but in the end it never fully realized itself and the noticeable impacts were
insignificant. However, in broader terms the end of World War II signaled the
beginning of a renaissance of international affairs; a permanent fixation on
striving for international dialogue that had failed during the interwar period. It was
under these conditions that the Frenchmen Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman
were able to make an effective case to establish the ECSC.

Building the Community and Early Eurosceptics
Arguably the most influential document on European integration
transmitted in the postwar years was the Schuman Declaration, written jointly by
French foreign minister Robert Schuman and political advisor Jean Monnet. It
was finalized on 9 May 1950 and was presented to the Council of Europe later
7

that year. It called for the formation of a “cartel” that controlled coal and steel
industries between France, Germany, and other members under a supranational
“High Authority.”13 The integration of these industries directly removed the
incentives for Germany and France to outproduce one another and compete the
manner prevalent throughout the prewar years. Schuman and Monnet stated
their desire to finally resolve Franco-German militarism:
The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of
the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in
the first place concern these two countries.14
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) emerged as the first
step of European integration. The ECSC consisted of France, Germany, Italy,
and the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg). It was a key
moment, but only symbolic and is dwarfed in comparison to the scope and size of
the European Union that exists in the twenty-first century. However, the wish of
the idealists of the time was that integration in one area would eventually need to
spill over into other areas.15 Then came the proposed European Defence
Community (EDC), an attempt to integrate militaries in the same way coal and
steel were regulated under the ECSC. However, this was very much at odds with
the mission of NATO and the enormous influence of the United States and
United Kingdom in European defense – a fact that sustains until the present day.
Subsequently, the EDC failed to materialize when the treaty was rejected by

13. Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950, European Union.
14. Schuman and Monnet, Schuman Declaration, 1950.
15. See spillover in Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe, (London: Stevens, 1958).
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France, who at the time was still attempting to hold onto its overseas empire,
keep its republic intact, and keep the FRG in check. Thus, in 1957 the original six
gathered once again to establish the European Economic Community (EEC).
The EEC was the vehicle for integration, not integration in and of itself. While the
EEC did establish a customs union and common market, it only proposed the
development of policy specifics. Herein lies the major problem for integration for
decades to come: nation-states and their own interests conflicting with each
other on top of their battle with technocrats and their schemes.
A common portrayal for the origins of Euroscepticism is that it began with
Margaret Thatcher, which will be included later in this chapter. However, it is
reasonable to suggest that Euroscepticism began before the time of Thatcher via
Charles de Gaulle during his tenure as President of France in the 1960s. De
Gaulle continuously ran against the supranational goals of the EEC, an institution
in which he had very little involvement in its establishment. The 1966 ‘empty
chair’ quandary and the subsequent concessions given to de Gaulle are
exemplary of his mission to rein in the powers of the European institutions and
assert French interests. De Gaulle rejected, once in 1963 and again in 1967, the
accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC on the grounds that they were
incompatible with the continental economy:
England in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked through her
exchanges, her markets, her supply lines to the most diverse and often
the most distant countries; she pursues essentially industrial and

9

commercial activities, and only slight agricultural ones. She has in all her
doings very marked and very original habits and traditions.16
De Gaulle believed that by bringing the United Kingdom into the EEC, it
would create an imbalance too large to correct, especially in the sensitive and
contentiously settled Common Agricultural Policy. Also key in his opposition was
his skepticism of the Atlanticism between the UK and the United States – a sideeffect of the Cold War geopolitical realities. The inclusion of the British would
eventually lead to complications when negotiating a future treaty on defense
cooperation. Nevertheless, de Gaulle’s type of opposition is significant because
many British Eurosceptics reutilized his same arguments to leave in the 2016
referendum campaign. Nigel Farage, the most widely known British Eurosceptic
since Thatcher, stated this quite well in the days before the referendum vote:
As an independent country we would be free to cooperate and trade with
our European neighbours whilst re-engaging with the wider world including
our kith and kin in the Commonwealth.17
It should be noted that up to this point, European integration in reality
consisted of just intergovernmental cooperation and strictly economic integration.
Despite the varied viewpoints of its participants, this imperfect solution is what
was manifested within the unique postwar and geopolitical situation. The mixed
and rough road to establish any cooperation was unquestionably difficult to
navigate politically. To the credit of the Europeans, it was an immense hurdle to

16. “Press Conference held by General de Gaulle, 14 January 1963,” Western European Union
Assembly-General Affairs Committee: A Retrospective View of the Political Year in Europe 1963,
(Paris: Western European Union Assembly-General Affairs Committee, 1964), 20-22.
17. Nigel Farage, “Why you should vote for Brexit this Thursday,” The Independent, last modified
20 June 2016.
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overcome and no reasonable scholar would suggest that any integration was
going to be a politically convenient process. This is the major takeaway from the
1950s and 1960s – the project was and will continue to be a political project
although originally advertising itself as being an economic one. As Schuman and
Monnet stated in their declaration, the beginning of European solidarity was with
France and Germany. There was no widespread support for a shared, common
trajectory from that origin, as seen in the nationalist posture from de Gaulle. This
will be important later in the twentieth century as enlargement and a more
political union takes center stage amid the collapse of the Cold War geopolitical
order.

Maastricht and ‘Euro-phoria’
Heading into the late 1980s, much of western Europe was integrated into
the European Communities (EC) – the EEC, EURATOM, and ECSC.18 The
United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland joined in 1973. Greece joined in 1981,
followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. The geographic groupings of these three
enlargements is not just a coincidence – EU enlargement hinged upon regions
and governmental change. If Country A who relied on trade from a nearby
Country B joined, it is in the interest of Country B to join. On the other hand,
accession to the EC became a goal if a country shed itself of its past, whether it
be the British ending its empire after the Suez debacle or the end of the Franco

18. EURATOM, or the European Atomic Energy Community, was integration of nuclear energy, a
product of settling Cold War insecurities about controlling nuclear materials.
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regime in Spain. The EC signified humanism and socio-economic progress. The
enlargement agenda that began in the 1970s changed the dynamics of European
integration. Rather than being a French-German project of intercontinental
conflict avoidance based upon economic multilateralism, the EC became the
‘endgame’ for many countries on the outside. While the enlargement program
was taking place, a new endeavor to expand integration into new spheres
commenced.
Near the later years of his life, then-elected MEP Altiero Spinelli drafted
several reports in the mid-1980s that encouraged a new treaty to reignite the bid
for increased political integration. Finally, Spinelli’s draft for a new treaty was
adopted by the European Parliament.19 This move inspired the European Council
to relaunch the integration project. The Fontainebleau meetings led to the
creation and ratification of the Single European Act in 1986.20 This amending
treaty proposed European exploration into integration of new areas, including a
common foreign policy and common currency.21 This renewed interest in the late
1980s is the most significant and concrete contribution by Spinelli, despite his
long record of advocacy for European unity.
The passage of the Single European Act in 1986 also sparked a parallel
vision for Europe that ran against centralization in Brussels and against more

19. Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, Bulletin of the European Communities, Office
for the Publications of the European Communities, 14 February 1984.
20. Conclusions of Fontainebleau European Council, Bulletin of the European Communities,
Office for the Publications of the European Communities, 24 and 25 June 1984.
21. “Single European Act,” Official Journal of the European Communities 169, EUR-Lex, 29 June
1987.
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transferal of sovereignty. The undercurrents of twenty-first century and
mainstreamed Euroscepticism initiated in the United Kingdom in the 1980s.
When contemporary media pundits, academia, and naïve, inept observers of
British politics are surprised about the degree of Euroscepticism and distrust of
European institutions, they fail to look at the longer history of evidence that would
support the opposite of that view. While de Gaulle was concerned with British
incompatibility with continental Europe, Margaret Thatcher expressed the very
opposite position, specifically European incompatibility with Britain, in her later
years as Prime Minister. Aside from her legacy of neoliberal reforms to the British
economy, Thatcher’s major legacy was warning about increased levels of
integration directed from Brussels, based on principles of supranationalism.22
This position on Europe was nuanced – she explicitly stated that Britain must
have a place in political, economic, and cultural Europe, but it does not have a
place in an “institutional” Europe. In possibly the most famous except from this
speech, she articulated the language that would become recurring among future
Eurosceptics:
Europe is not the creation of the Treaty of Rome. Nor is the European idea
the property of any group or institution... ...We have not successfully rolled
back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a
European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance
from Brussels.23

22. Margaret Thatcher, Speech to the College of Europe in Bruges, 20 September 1988,
Margaret Thatcher Foundation.
23. Thatcher, Speech to the College of Europe in Bruges, 1988.
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The Treaty of Maastricht, ratified in 1992 and put into effect the following
year, had little to do with economic integration. It had much more to do with the
‘making’ of Europe – a ‘forward’ looking Europe. This was the first time the
European Union was referred to as such in an official capacity, a name change
that signaled increased consolidation. The three existing organs, the ECSC,
EEC, and EURATOM, fell under one ‘European Community’ and became
coordinated with newly established bodies on justice affairs and foreign policy. 24
The European Union consisted of these three pillars, with the latter two
maintaining an intergovernmental purpose. The most important features of
Maastricht were the creation of European citizenship and procurement of the
specific requirements for a common currency.25
The political reaction to Maastricht allows a more historical understanding
of the treaty than the actual provisions of the treaty. The treaty was only
marginally ratified in a French referendum and barely rejected in a Danish
referendum. While the French government of Francois Mitterrand accepted this
result, Denmark conducted a winning second referendum with several opt-outs.
Maastricht served as a turning point. The integration agenda began to be
marketed to the European voter as an attempt to democratize major alterations
to the project. From 1992 to present, more referendums on the European Union

24. In listing each founding ‘capital’ of the project, Tony Judt categorized Maastricht as where
future decisions of the “thing” were negotiated – a jab at the increasingly decentralized
appearance of European institutions. See Tony Judt, A Grand Illusion?: An Essay on Europe,
(New York: New York University Press, 2011), 109-110.
25. “Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992,” Official Journal of the
European Communities 191, Vol. 35, EUR-Lex, 29 July 1992.
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were conducted than in all previous years, even when excluding membership
referendums. Despite this, there still existed a democratic deficit – a
characterization that has been a popular focus of social scientists. Election after
election to the European Parliament and as more member countries joined,
abysmally low turnout among the whole of European citizens persisted well into
the new millennium.

Table 1. Overall Turnout in European Parliament Elections, 1979-201426
1979

1984

1989

1994

1999

2004

2009

2014

61.99%

58.98%

58.41%

56.67%

49.51%

45.47%

42.97%

42.61%

Failure to increase the powers of the European Parliament only compounded the
issue. The amplest of opportunities was squandered during negotiations for the
Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 – which ironically focused partly on easing potential
enlargement into the former satellites of the Soviet Union. Many of these member
countries have among the lowest turnout in European Parliament elections. It is
unclear if overall turnout will continue to hover where it has been for the past two
decades. However, what has become evident is that the European Union must
work to improve turnout in its elections if it wishes to hold itself to a high standard
of democratic legitimacy. The European elections since the new millennium have

26. “Turnout, Results of the 2014 European Parliament Elections,” European Parliament, 2014.
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interestingly become ripe ground for hardline Eurosceptics to gain power and
media attention.
The introduction of the Euro currency in 2002 was perhaps the biggest
moment of the European project since its beginning in the 1950s. It was all but a
dream among the European visionaries of the immediate postwar years.
However, as what will be described in the following chapter, it has also become
the most problematic element of the project, especially in recent years. While on
paper a unified monetary union was supposed to stimulate a European identity
among its members, this has never materialized. The Eurozone crisis that formed
because of the overall declination of the global financial outlook tested the
promises of European integration. Echoing the sentiments of historian Timothy
Garton Ash, if one lucky person was to freeze themselves early 2005, they would
be complacent with the state of the European Union.27 His ‘Euro-phoria’ was
unequivocally true for that time, but history is never linear and has never reliably
operated in that manner.28 History is a dynamic and volatile process that unfolds
every second and every minute of every day. Likely the most overused example
for this type of error is how the September 11 attacks and subsequent War on
Terror humiliated Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis.29 The era of

27. Timothy Garton Ash, “Is Europe Disintegrating?” New York Review of Books 64, No. 1 (2017).
28. The term ‘Euro-phoria’ is borrowed from economist Joseph Stiglitz’s use of the term ‘Euroeuphoria’ to describe people’s perception Euro-led prosperity after 2002. See in Joseph Stiglitz,
The Euro: How A Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe, (London: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2016), 114.
29. Fukuyama’s thesis has been brutally maimed since its publication but remains as a perennial
example of ahistorical thinking. See Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The National
Interest, No. 16 (1989): 3-18.
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European history that has taken place since 2008 works on this same
presupposition – at the time of this thesis’ publication, the European Union is not
a closer union. Integration has stalled significantly despite the successes of the
twentieth century. Therefore, this thesis begins with the first episode - the global
financial crisis in the European Union.

17

CHAPTER TWO:
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
The beginning of the Global Economic Crisis was triggered by the burst of
a seriously inflated housing and subprime mortgage bubble in the United States.
Loose credit and deregulation allowed unqualified borrowers to purchase homes
at inflated prices, many times for the sole purpose of flipping them and cashing in
on the rising equity. This model of artificial economic expansion was repeated in
many areas of the world, but in Europe it was primarily confined to countries such
as Ireland and Spain. In the high velocity globalized world economy of the
twenty-first century, contractionary business cycles and a loss of confidence in
markets spread like wildfire within a short period of time. The crisis in 2008, and
the years following, is further evidence that the world economy is being shaped
by the forces of globalization.
This chapter intends to accomplish three tasks. The first is an exploration
of why a crisis as dreadful as the one in 2008 would cause the Eurozone to fall
into dysfunction. The fundamentals of the institutions that created the Euro are
arguably the most responsible for the currency’s failure. Secondly, it is important
to understand the numbers of the crisis itself, if only to demonstrate how austerity
measures did nothing to assist the recovery of the Eurozone’s struggling
members. Finally, this chapter begins a crucial discussion on the political shifts in
Germany: a Eurozone member that emerged from the economic crisis both
economically successful and more powerful in the European Union. These shifts
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were almost entirely prompted by the Eurozone crisis, as opposed to the longterm trends that have already existed in European politics for decades.

Constructing the Euro in a Divergent Eurozone
Economic divisions have historically defined the European continent,
typically standing alongside more essential divisions in ethnic makeup, culture,
language, and governance. One can start in the North-South divide, where the
Northern countries of Europe have generally been better off than their Southern
counterparts. The East-West divide is perhaps the most recent economic division
in memory, dividing the free market democracies from the authoritarian centrally
planned satellites of the Soviet Union. This is also quite misleading, as the East
was always historically distinct from the West.30 Within nation-states themselves,
there have unquestionably existed divisions between industrial-commercial
centers, the “super-regions” of Europe, and the rest of the country – often
outperforming political capitals. Catalonia is likely the most extreme example of
economic “self-sufficiency,” often intersecting with long-held feelings of linguistic
and cultural nationalisms.31 Since the economic downturn and political crisis in
Spain, it was reasonable that advocacy for more autonomy or outright
independence from Madrid intensified. In Catalonia and similar regions of
Europe, it is common for independence to mean liberation from what separatists

30. Referenced by Tony Judt in A Grand Illusion? on page 127, Larry Wolff argued that the EastWest divides in the Cold War significantly predate 1945. See Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern
Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment, (Stanford: 1995).
31. Judt, A Grand Illusion?, 112.
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view as the outdated nation-state and entrance into the sphere of “Europe.”32
This was the environment that the Euro was constructed within, and only
scratches the surface why the Euro was likely to fail upon its introduction.
In establishing the Euro, its founding visionaries did not fully think through
the potential negative, unexpected consequences of implementing a common
currency. Of course, there are infinite valuable qualities to having the same
currency across borders. The most obvious purpose is for travel through and
relocating between countries. If a European wanted to take an extended road trip
within the entire Eurozone, which at the time of its establishment included
Schengen rules, that traveler would not have to juggle national currencies. See
Table 2 for the list of currencies that ceased to exist following each Eurozone
member’s adoption of the Euro. This does not include microstates and other
countries that use the Euro outside the Eurozone.

32. Unlike the unsuccessful attempts made by Catalans over the years to gain more autonomy
(and in 2017, to unsuccessfully declare independence), Scotland held a legitimate independence
referendum in 2014. It was struck down by the “No” vote, but what was profound were the
arguments made by the “Yes” voters. Those voting on the Yes side were anti-Unionist – but ProEuropean, seeing themselves as more European than a part of Britain. An independent Scotland
would have had to reapply for EU membership – and gain approval from all 28 EU members,
including Spain.
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Table 2. Eurozone Members and Their Former National Currencies.33
Country
Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Portugal
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain

Currency
Austrian schilling
Belgian franc
Cypriot pound
Estonian kroon
Finnish markka
French franc
German mark
Greek drachma
Irish pound
Italian lira
Latvian lats
Lithuanian litas
Luxembourgish franc
Maltese lira
Dutch guilder
Portuguese escudo
Slovak koruna
Slovenian tolar
Spanish peseta

Year Endeda
2002
2002
2008
2011
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2014
2015
2002
2008
2002
2002
2009
2007
2002

a. Physical cash ended.

As Table 2 may suggest upon initial glance, the Eurozone is not an
‘ordinary’ monetary union, but an enormous area that extends over a diverse and
large population of Europeans, each with differing national economies, histories,
and cultures. Herein lies the first obstacle to the Euro. While it may have
expedited travel and business between members, any feelings of unity between
Europeans, a desire of the currency’s founders, was not immediately realized nor
was guaranteed to occur. A comparison to the United States illustrates this point

33

“Joining the Euro Area,” European Central Bank, last accessed 15 January 2019.
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best.34 The Europeans, as much as they distrust the Americans, naïvely compare
themselves to the United States, which uses a single currency. This is unwise for
several reasons, but the most important is the unavoidable fact that the United
States has a common national heritage and culture that is more concrete and
unified than that of most European countries, regardless of where one might live.
For this reason, an American moving from state to state will have a much easier
time doing so – and if for economic reasons no reasonable American would have
much concern. New arrivals in another state would certainly be welcomed and it
would never have a net negative impact on the United States national
economy.35 Replay this scenario in the Eurozone, where say, young educated
Italians are leaving a recessionary Italy for economic opportunity elsewhere –
which did happen across the Mediterranean.36 Not only would Italians still living
in Italy have concern, but there is no assurance that an Italian will seamlessly
establish themselves in another country or sense that they are “welcomed” by the
culture or native born citizenry in that country. This scenario does not suggest a
common experience or that efficient movement within Europe is outright
impossible, but it should have been something for the founders to consider
alongside the positive benefits of a common currency. In 1999, the incoming

34

Stiglitz, The Euro, 89-92.
35. Stiglitz uses a comparison of movement between a rural, underpopulated state like South
Dakota and an urban, overpopulated state like California to make this point.
36. Lafleur, Jean-Michel, Mikolaj Stanek, and Alberto Veira, “South-North Labour Migration Within
the Crisis-Affected European Union: New Patterns, New Contexts and New Challenges,” in
South-North Migration of EU Citizens in Times of Crisis, ed. Jean-Michel Lafleur and Mikolaj
Stanek, (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017).

22

European Commission headed by Romano Prodi recognized this as something
not yet reached – a common European identity did not exist despite having the
most amount of integration the project has seen in its lifespan:
We come from different countries. We speak different languages. We
have different historical and cultural traditions. And we must preserve
them. But we are seeking a shared identity – a new European soul.37
Referring to the previous discussion on the developments in European
politics during the 1980s and 1990s, the concept of multi-speed integration has
had an enormous impact on the cohesiveness of the European Union. Like the
adoption of the Schengen Treaty, not every EU member adopted the Euro
currency. Denmark and the United Kingdom opted out of the Euro during the
negotiation and ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty.38 The United
Kingdom is the extreme case, being one of the largest economies within the EU.
Following the crash of the pound on Black Wednesday, the pound was pulled out
of the Exchange Rate Mechanism after only two years of membership. 39 The
economic turbulence of the early 1990s paved the way for a landslide result by
“New Labour” in the 1997 general election. Without adopting the Euro, the United
Kingdom experienced significant growth in their economy until the 2008 crash.
While the United Kingdom had difficulty due to economic confidence, the Danish

37. Romano Prodi, Speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, 14 September 1999,
European Commission Press Release Database.
38. Denmark received opt-outs after the No vote won a referendum in 1990. Another referendum
was conducted in 1993 to approve the Maastricht Treaty including the opt-outs, with the Yes vote
winning.
39. Larry Elliott, Will Hutton and Julie Wolf, “Pound drops out of ERM,” The Guardian, 17
September 1992.
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government had difficulty receiving popular support under the ardently pro-EU
government of Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. The 2000 Danish referendum on joining
the Euro resulted in a “No” vote; however, the Danish krone is still a member of
the ERM. Debates on the EU and determining on entering the Eurozone
continued to dominate Danish politics well into the 2000s and 2010s.
If it wasn’t multi-speed integration that would hinder monetary union, it
would be the design of the institutions themselves. The European Central Bank
(ECB) has a significant flaw. It pays careful attention on price stability but
maintains an ambiguous policy attentive to full employment. This is crucial in
understanding why such a crisis that happened in 2008 and the years following
would cause major suffering within the Eurozone. Its leading and only mandate is
price stability, or inflation.40 This is perhaps due to the focus on currency
valuations leading up to the issuance of the Euro. Alternatively, it could be that
heavy German influence on the founding of the ECB prioritized controlling
inflation. Germany has had a fixation on inflation since Weimar-era hyperinflation.
Also worth mentioning was the selected location of the ECB headquarters in
Frankfurt. The ECB does have a mandate to control inflation, but most
importantly lacks any other mandates such as full employment and economic
stability. For example, in the United States the Federal Reserve was given a

40. “On the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank,”
Official Journal of the European Union C202 (2016): 231.
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mandate for full employment in 1946. Recently, they were handed an additional
mandate for economic growth following the Great Recession.41
The lack of a multi-dimensional and flexible agenda in the ECB screams
neoliberalism. The ECB is unique in that its founding took place after the rise of
neoliberal philosophy in economics, compared to the establishment of other
major central banks. The ECB accepted that it had social responsibility, but is
completely self-defeating in its sole reliance on using its mandate on price
stability to generate recovery and growth in the event of a severe catastrophe.
Compare this again to the United States Federal Reserve System, where it has a
dual mandate for both price stability and employment. While the actions of the
Federal Reserve might be divisive to some economists, it is beyond question that
it had a much better toolbox than the Europeans to deal with the crisis after
2008.42 No such anticipation or preparation for an economic crisis was taken in
the Eurozone. Perhaps the Euro-phoria of the early 2000s was enough to squash
concerns. Nevertheless, the complete faith in the Euro currency, and more
broadly the market, underlines the governing philosophy of ECB officials.
Neoliberalism defined the ECB; thus, it would use neoliberal procedures to
correct the failures of its members. This will be discussed in the following section
in relation to the failures in the Greek government and economy after 2008.

41. Stiglitz, The Euro, 146-148.
42. Stiglitz, The Euro, 157-163.
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The ECB is also unique in that it is a standalone institution of the
European Union. As discussed in Chapter One, the EU is an institution based
upon integration and cooperation of specific functions previously under control of
competing nation-states: one of the last major functions of EU members that was
never integrated was social welfare. Therefore, there was a situation from the
introduction of the Euro in 2002 onward where a Eurozone member used a
common currency for taxation and government spending, but had no say about
the spending behaviors of other members. The issue of economic integration
outpacing political and fiscal integration is possibly the long-term issue at hand in
the Eurozone.43 This became a problem following the 2008 crisis for countries
that were already spending well above their limits during the period of growth
preceding the downturn. Ground-zero for this crisis was the Mediterranean, with
the most notable Eurozone member, Greece. The following section of this
chapter explains the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone with a specific focus
on the Greek Depression.

Southern Europe and the Greek Depression
The global financial crisis affected every European country, European
Union member or not; Eurozone member or not. It showed the amount of
globalization that had taken place just on the regional scale. Economic
integration was advertised as a converging force, where the nations of Europe

43. Stiglitz, The Euro, 51-53.
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would have unified economies. However, the opposite was the case and has
always been the case. For instance, there is no evidence that in the near future
the Mediterranean can operate economically on the same level as the Northern
countries. As shown in the previous section of this chapter, GDP varied not just
between countries, but within certain countries. The global financial crisis
aggravated these disparities and led to true divergence in the Eurozone, a
monetary union founded on the basis that a common currency would uplift the
lesser economies of its members.

$45,000
$40,000
$35,000
$30,000
$25,000
$20,000
$15,000
$10,000

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

$5,000

Greece

Italy

Spain

Portugal

Eurozone Avg.

Figure 1. GDP Per Capita, Stated in United States Dollars for Greece, Italy,
Spain, Portugal, and the Eurozone, 1986-201644

44. “Gross domestic product (GDP), Total, US dollars/capita 1986-2016,” OECD Data, last
accessed Feb 10, 2019.
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Figure 1 shows this crucial point by looking at the historical trends of GDP in the
Eurozone, compared to the Mediterranean. The global financial crisis was
inevitable; however, it seems to be clear that being a member of the Eurozone
did not help, but rather hurt the economic recovery of the Mediterranean. It was
at this point these countries broke away from long term GDP growth trends.
The global financial crisis hit Greece the hardest out of any European
country. Foreign direct investments that had inflated the Greek economy to
unsustainable levels in the early-mid 2000s ceased to come to the aid the
country in 2009. Combine this major impact on the Greek economy with an
unreliable tax collection system and bloated government spending on salaries
and pensions. See Figure 4 on government debt-to-GDP ratios for Greece, in
addition to Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Most importantly, Greece was not under
their own currency anymore, but the Euro. The Greek government came to a
point where they could not raise the funds necessary to sustain their deficits.
Investors were not confident in lending money to the Greek government, even at
extremely high bond interest rates. This is on top of increased demand for
government spending to offset the rise in unemployment. In late 2009, credit
rating agencies S&P and Fitch downgraded Greece’s credit rating from A- to
BBB+ for the first time in about a decade.45 Their credit rating would eventually

45. Helena Smith and Ashley Seager, “Financial markets tumble after Fitch downgrades Greece’s
credit rating,” The Guardian, last modified 8 December 2009.
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be reduced to a C, or near-default, in 2011 and 2012.46 Confidence in the Greek
government and governments across the Eurozone plummeted.
The European Union and Eurozone members came to an agreement to
set up a safety net to assist several struggling countries that were under the
pressure of the global financial crisis, including Greece. The European Financial
Stability Mechanism (EFSM) and European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)
and were established by the European Commission and Council of the European
Union in May and June 2010.47 Under the EFSF specifically, a pool of funds
accumulated from Eurozone member contributions would be used to make
bailout loans. Some were exempt from supplying to the fund (see Table 3).

46. “Greece – Credit Rating, 1999 to 2018,” Trading Economics, last accessed February 3, 2019.
47. “EFSF Framework Agreement, Consolidated Version,” European Stability Mechanism, 19
October 2011, 1-41.
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Table 3. List of Guarantor Euro-Area Member States with Their Respective
Guarantee Commitments, European Financial Stability Facility, 2011 48
Country
Germany
France
Italy
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium
Greecea
Austria
Portugala
Finland
Irelanda
Slovakia
Slovenia
Estonia
Luxembourg
Cyprus
Malta

Commitments (Millions in €)
211,045.90
158,487.53
139,267.81
92,543.56
44,446.32
27,031.99
21,897.74
21,639.19
19,507.26
13,974.03
12,378.15
7,727.57
3,664.30
1,994.86
1,946.94
1,525.68
704.33

% of Total
27.06%
20.32%
17.86%
11.87%
5.70%
3.47%
2.81%
2.76%
2.50%
1.79%
1.59%
0.99%
0.46%
0.26%
0.25%
0.20%
0.09%

a. Greece, Ireland, and Portugal are “Stepping-Out Guarantors,” meaning that they are not
obliged to contribute funds to the EFSF.

The most important point to understand about the EFSM and EFSF is that
they were intergovernmental as opposed to federal. National governments and
the executive politicians at the European Union assumed sole responsibility for
entering and implementing the safety net – not the European Parliament, nor the
peoples of the European Union. European federalism and the hope of a
democratic, unified Europe perished. Referring to the EFSF pool, accumulated

48. “EFSF Framework Agreement,” European Stability Mechanism, 19 October 2011, 38.
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funds were used to bail out Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, hence why they were
not obligated to provide funds. On the other hand, better-off Eurozone members,
primarily Germany, shouldered most of the burden. This led to the perception
that Germany was steering the Euro ship, with German Chancellor Angela
Merkel at the helm. On paper this was not necessarily true, but the consensus at
the time among the media, some politicians, and general European public was
that German influence on bailouts was more substantial than what appeared on
the surface. German economic growth and trade surpluses in the decade
following the economic downturn emphasizes the credence of this perception.
With the establishment of the EFSM and EFSF, entering onto the stage
were the Troika group. Consisting of the European Commission, International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Central Bank (ECB), the Troika were
the negotiators responsible for handing bailouts to national governments in
financial crisis. As discussed previously in this chapter, the ECB is an institution
characterized by inflexibility and neoliberalism. The IMF was no stranger to
neoliberalism either. The IMF was responsible for bailing out several countries
globally, with the most notable example in Argentina and their depression at the
turn of the millennium.49 The typical case for a bailout program was that there
were strings attached to the loans, otherwise known as “conditionality.” Bailout
money was withheld until implementation of specific measures, with the most

49. Joseph Stiglitz wrote an extensive critique of neoliberal-driven globalization, observing the
actions of the IMF and other international institutions. See Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its
Discontents, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002).
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destructive usually being reducing government spending, known as austerity.
These conditions would be applied in the case of bailing out Eurozone members
under the EFSF rules.
The Troika were responsible for administering two bailout programs to
Greece.50 The first came in May 2010 under the Panhellenic Socialist Movement
(PASOK) government headed by George Papandreou, son of former Greek
prime minister Andreas Papandreou.51 The bailout package consisted of €110
billion Euro. Following the implementation of austerity as required by the 2010
bailout, popularity of his government plummeted and animosity toward the Troika
skyrocketed. The 2010 bailout marked the beginning of the anti-austerity
movement in Greece. In order to shore up public support and show the Troika
that the bailout would be “owned” by the country, Papandreou promised a
referendum on the bailout package. This went against the wishes of the Troika
and subsequently, no such referendum was held, leading to more resentment
among the people.52 Members of Papandreou’s own party began openly revolting
against his leadership, leading to his resignation in late 2011. The year 2011
marked the worst year of the Greek Depression, as it was referred to as from
then on, with an extraordinary 9.13% decline in GDP growth (see Figure 4). 2011
was also the most violent year in anti-austerity riots and protests. With

50. The Troika also handed out bailout programs to Ireland and Portugal under the EFSF (20102012).
51. “Statement by the Eurogroup,” European Council and Council of the European Union,
Brussels, 2 May 2010.
52. Helena Smith and David Gow, “Papandreou scraps Greek referendum as open warfare
erupts in his party,” The Guardian, last modified 3 November 2011.
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Papandreou finally ousted from his post, a technocratic government was
established not long afterwards with the express purpose of implementing the
conditions of future bailout programs.53
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Figure 2. Annual GDP Growth (%) in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, 2006201654

The man to head the new technocratic government in Greece was former
ECB vice president Lucas Papademos.55 Under his six-month tenure, he led a

53. PASOK was not alone in their demise. The economic crisis coupled with increasing
resentment toward globalization through free trade and immigration left social democrats crippled
in most of Europe.
54. World Bank Open Data, GDP Growth (annual %), accessed January 20, 2019.
55. Greece was not alone in the ushering in of a technocratic government. Italy also formed a
technocratic-national unity government led by Mario Monti, lasting from 2011 to 2013.
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turbulent national unity government that included PASOK, New Democracy, and
LAOS.56 The relationship between Papademos and the political parties was
contentious. Despite this, the government agreed to their second bailout program
in February 2012.57 This bailout package consisted of €100 billion and introduced
a private sector involvement (PSI), which allowed private creditors to purchase
Greek bonds with a voluntary option for a “haircut” upon maturation. Public
reaction was violent and destructive as more austerity was imposed by the
country’s government. The second bailout resulted in the burning of more than
40 buildings in Athens and widespread rioting across Greece.58 Austerityexacerbated depression led to a long list of transformations in Greek society and
politics. The back-to-back elections held later that year saw the growth of
extremist elements in Greek society – most notably the outright fascistic and neoNazi political party Golden Dawn. A new political force in Greek politics known as
SYRIZA came to power in Greece in 2015. SYRIZA, or the Coalition of the
Radical Left, is an anti-austerity party that became responsible for fresh
negotiations with the Troika for more bailout loans – and ironically the
implementation of more austerity measures over the next few years.59

56. Suzanne Daley, “Economist Named to Lead Greek Unity Government,” New York Times, last
modified 10 November 2011.
57. “Eurogroup statement,” European Stability Mechanism, 21 February 2012.
58. Niki Kitsantonis and Rachel Dinadio, “Greek Parliament Passes Austerity Plan After Riots
Rage,” New York Times, last modified 12 February 2012.
59. An anti-austerity party committing to austerity might be indicative of how significant the fiscal
problems in Greece were. Nevertheless, the damage has been done in Greece and other
Eurozone members. The youth still suffer tremendously from unemployment, or even worse,
dropping out of society altogether. It is not clear what other cards the Troika would have to play
should the global economy contract in the future.
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2006-201660

While the violence gained media headlines and attention of observers on
the outside, protests only represent the surface-level manifestation of the
incredible suffering inflicted upon the Greek people. Poverty and unemployment
ate away at Greek society and civility. Charts, graphs, and numbers will never
fully capture this. Echoing the photography project in the United States during
their Great Depression, a group of Greek photographers went about capturing
the aesthetic and stories of the people who experienced the Depression.61 This is
perhaps the largest take-away from the Greek Depression – at the high political

60. OECD Data, General Government Debt, accessed February 3, 2019.
61. A photography project of the Greek Depression called ‘Depression Era’ was created in 2012
to capture stories of Greeks suffering from the crisis. Accessible at: https://depressionera.gr/
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level, politicians and EU bureaucrats carved up Greece, while the people
themselves were left largely disinterested or powerless. Many left the country,
like so many others in Europe, to find economic opportunity elsewhere. However,
politics still lives on in the Eurozone. The following section will conclude this
examination of the global financial crisis by assessing the political realignment
that began to take place in Germany amidst the bailouts, protests, and social
decay in the Mediterranean.

Germany and Anti-Euro Resentment
Perhaps the most noticeable change to appear out of the Eurozone and
sovereign debt crisis was the intensification of national politics in member states.
Ground zero for the crisis was arguably Greece, as explored in the previous
section of this chapter. Therefore, the most radical changes in the political
landscape took place in that country. Nevertheless, political unrest because of
austerity and Troika decrees was broad and the strongest throughout the
Mediterranean region of the Eurozone. On the other hand, anti-Euro sentiment
assembled in unlikely, unscathed places in response to the measures taken by
their governments to rescue the failing economies of the Eurozone. The purpose
of this section is to touch upon the political realignment that picked up pace
during the Eurozone crisis, namely the pervasiveness of an alternative political
movement in Germany.
The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) political party is very much an
exception in contemporary European politics. The party is typically grouped into
36

the family of right-wing populist political parties found in Europe. While this
categorization is problematic due to ideological discrepancies between parties, it
clarifies the long-term and broader political winds that have swept through
Europe since the 1990s. Chapter Four of this thesis will investigate the
complexity of these types of movements and their impact on their respective
countries and the European Union. Nevertheless, the AfD is unique in that it was
only founded in 2013, primarily as an anti-Euro currency party and more
significantly as a right-wing political voice against the Angela Merkel-led CDU.
One of its founding members, Bernd Lucke, specified their political location at
their first conference:
We want to put an end to the flagrant breach of democratic, legal and
economic principles that we have seen in the past three years, because
Chancellor Merkel’s government said there is no alternative. Now it is
here, the Alternative für Deutschland.62

The AfD is the most successful national political party in Germany to run
further right to the CDU since the founding of the FRG, surpassing the more
extremist, neo-Nazi Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD). Under
the leadership of Lucke, running from its founding in 2013 to his ousting in 2015,
the party attracted a sizeable coalition of the German electorate on its anti-Euro
platform.63 In its first attempt to enter the Bundestag in the 2013 federal election,

62

Bernd Lucke, Speech to the First AfD Party Congress, 14 April 2013. Retrieved from Nicholas
Kulish and Melissa Eddy, “German Elites Drawn to Anti-Euro Party, Spelling Trouble for Merkel,”
New York Times, last modified 14 April 2013.
63. One of the first studies on the ideology of the AfD voter base was conducted following the
2013 German federal election. See Nicole Berbuir, Marcel Lewandowsky, and Jasmin Siri, "The
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its policy positions on European affairs were characteristically Eurosceptic,
advocating for the elimination of the Euro and return of sovereignty to national
parliaments, but limited in the defense of the common market:
We call for an orderly dissolution of the Euro area. Germany does not
need the Euro... ...We affirm a Europe of sovereign states with one
common internal market.64
These types of policy positions reflected two specific sentiments of its
founders: party members, and voter base. Firstly, it was a response to the
undemocratic nature of the Eurozone, both in its initial implementation and
contemporary maintenance of the crisis. The AfD had a particular issue with the
CDU-FDP coalition’s decision to ratify Germany’s participation in the EFSM,
EFSF, and later the ESM, without a referendum of the German people.
Furthermore, their manifesto made in explicit terms that private financial
institutions, not the German taxpayer, should bear the burden for rescue policies.
Secondly, it sympathized with the plight of the debt-laden members of the Euro,
proposing debt forgiveness and approval of referenda on Euro currency
membership. While the AfD barely missed the required 5% threshold in 2013,
they would later go on to gain seats as elected members of the European
Parliament in 2014. In 2016, they scored several big gains in state elections, the
most notable being in Saxony-Anhalt where AfD won second place in the popular

AfD and Its Sympathisers: Finally a Right-Wing Populist Movement in Germany?" German
Politics 24, no. 2 (2014): 1-25.
64. Text in original form: “Wir fordern eine geordnete Auflösung des Euro-Währungsgebietes.
Deutschland braucht den Euro nicht... ...Wir bejahen ein Europa souveräner Staaten mit einem
gemeinsamen Binnenmarkt.” The full text of party positions can be found in “Wahlprogramm
Parteitagsbeschluss vom 14.04.2013,” Alternative für Deutschland, 14 April 2013.
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vote. From its founding in 2013 to present day, no other political party wishes to
govern with the AfD, resulting in incredibly complicated and politically painful
coalitions after state elections. Being such a young political party, these gains are
impressive when compared to other right-wing populists who have contested in
elections for decades.
No matter how successful the AfD will be in the future, the realignment
has already occurred and there is no going back. Germany, a country long
thought to be the bastion of European unity and most immune to right-wing
populism, has made room for political outsiders and the radical right through its
involvement in remedying the Eurozone crisis. It shall be noted that the AfD
started as an anti-Euro party but quickly shifted to anti-immigration campaigning.
This is what will be discussed in Chapter Four. The AfD along with so many other
political forces across Europe quickly prioritized campaigning against immigration
following the European Migrant-Refugee Crisis. However, in the following
chapter, this thesis will first take a glance at the principal adversary of the
European Union in the arena of foreign policy – Putin’s Russia.
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CHAPTER THREE:
RUSSIAN MEDDLING ON THE NEW PERIPHERY
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Europe is a perennial battleground for the clash of major world powers.
Adjusting for scale over the years, a balance of power on the continent has
consistently been the norm. Competition between city-states and kingdoms
evolved into competition between powerful nation-states and empires. A defining
political characteristic of Europeans in their history is the propensity to make war
over recurrent disruptions to the balance of power. Likewise, Europeans hold the
role of being the peacemakers of their continent. While the breakdown of
diplomacy causes war, it must be remembered that diplomacy ends wars. The
end of wars either reinforce balance of power, incrementally shifts balance of
power in a certain direction, or completely transforms international relations.
The most obvious transformation is the emergence of international conflict
between the United States and Soviet Union towards the end of World War II.
While the British and French held power in postwar global institutions such as the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), they were for all intents and purposes
reduced to second-tier powers. The nucleus of interstate competition that had
been present in Europe for centuries was supplanted by global international
conflict between two new superpowers. On postwar defense policy, many
European armies scaled back their militaries and relegated this responsibility to
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the outside superpowers, either voluntarily or against their will.65 The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a collective defense alliance formed in
1949 and led primarily by the United States. It includes most of the European
countries held within the American-British-French sphere of postwar influence at
the end of World War II.66 As its name suggested, NATO created an Atlantic
military alliance defined by Atlanticism. This was very different from military
alliances of the past, where the United States was adamant in their attempt to
maintain neutrality. On top of this relationship was the Marshall Plan, or the
European Recovery Program, where the United States sent large amounts of
direct relief to Europe, even those becoming increasingly under the thumb of the
Soviets.67 Some Europeans were ambivalent to the extent of assistance, which
were reflected in major splits within politicians in the postwar era.
While the Marshall Plan assistance expired in the 1950s, the continued
intrusion of the United States into European affairs remained contested among
the Europeans. As alluded to in Chapter One, the ECSC was an attempt for
Europeans to take control of their own postwar destiny and accept responsibility
for their own continental affairs.68 Despite the EEC being established following

65. Another key component to reduction in military was the scaling back of European empire.
Decolonization began immediately after World War II and lasted well into the postwar years.
66. “North Atlantic Treaty,” in United States Treaties and International Agreements: 1776-1949,
edited by Charles I. Bevans, Library of Congress, accessed February 29, 2019.
67. Many countries were prevented from attending the meetings associated with the Marshall
Plan, or dissuaded from accepting the aid from the United States. This fits into the larger postwar
narrative of increasing tension between the US and USSR.
68. Another strong example of moving away from Atlanticism and Europe taking responsibility
was when Adenauer and de Gaulle signed the Élysée Treaty in 1963. See “Treaty between the
French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on French-German Cooperation,”
Western European Union Assembly-General Affairs Committee: A Retrospective View of the
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the Treaty of Rome in 1957, there were still some voices of support for expansion
into other areas, such as defense and security. Some were enthusiastic, and
some were skeptical about further integration. The EDC was abandoned when
the French voiced strong opposition to such a radical surrender of sovereignty,
and even then its establishment would be met by American protest. Thus, NATO
was reluctantly accepted as the hegemonic defenders of Europe that we still see
today, well after the collapse of its opposite Soviet assemblage of countries
inside the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw
Pact).
The collapse of the USSR did not shift the balance of power in Europe, or
in the world for that matter. The Russian Federation (or Russia) was not
guaranteed to succumb to the influence of the West, nor change views on
important issues such as respect for human rights, preference toward democratic
rule, and market liberalization. Russia’s status as the number two proprietor of
nuclear weapons cannot be overlooked, a fact that many unfortunately overlook
or outright forget. However, most importantly is the regime of Vladimir Putin,
whose presence in international relations is epitomized by boisterous alarmism or
uninformed lethargy. As this chapter will propose, Putin has managed to
resuscitate intercontinental conflict in Europe, mostly in an attempt to counter the
aforementioned intrusion of what he views as Western influence invading the

Political Year in Europe 1963, Paris: Western European Union Assembly-General Affairs
Committee, 1964.
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‘Russian sphere.’ Traditionally this type of European conflict has been presented
as simply the ‘West’ versus Russia. This chapter takes a different perspective
and defines the major conflict as a developing struggle between the European
Union and Russia. International relations scholars might disagree on which
power holds more justification in their behavior and action, but what is clear is
that history will show that as the European Union expands its own sphere, it does
so into a diminished Russian space.

The Russo-Georgian War and the Revival of Geopolitics in Europe
The first major reassertion of Russia in Europe after the termination of the
Soviet Union came in August 2008 in what would be called the Russo-Georgian
War. While this war was brief, lasting only five days, and was clearly one-sided
toward the Russian military, it stands as a key component in the larger picture of
international relations in the European region after the Cold War. Before
understanding the actual war and the pretexts for conflict, it is important to set
the stage as to why Russia, under then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, would
have the motivation to war with the small country of Georgia.
Unlike the largely peaceful revolutions in Europe that brought an end to
Soviet-directed communist governments, Georgia’s independence from the
actual Soviet Union was not without conflict between the various ethnic groups
that reside within its borders. Throughout its history under Soviet communism,
the regime that governed the Georgian SSR attempted to establish an efficient
command economy amongst competing ethnic groups while pleasing their Soviet
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bosses. Similar to the Balkans, the North Caucasus region is home to various
ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups that don’t necessarily fit together in perfect
nation-states. In the late 1980s, extreme nationalism flourished in the two
autonomous SSRs within the Georgian SSR: the Abkhazian ASSR and South
Ossetian ASSR. Amid the backdrop of Gorbachev’s reformism under glasnost,
the governments of these two autonomous republics within Georgia were
emboldened to demand more autonomy at the same time as the Georgian SSR
proper desired to gain its own independence. The early 1990s were the most
violent years, where Abkhazian and Ossetians in both these regions ethnically
cleansed and displaced thousands of Georgian people.69
Upon gaining independence, Georgia sought to eliminate autonomy for
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This immediately enflamed already-prevalent
hatred toward the Georgian people and government. After brief wars marred by
atrocities and intermittent Russian involvement on behalf of the separatist cause,
a peace agreement was brokered in 1992 between Russian and the Georgian
governments to end the South Ossetian conflict.70 The next year (1993) a
ceasefire was also brokered between Abkhazia and Georgia.71 The outcome was
that these two regions would be de facto independent, but internationally
observed as part of Georgia. While the United Nations was responsible for the

69. Philipp Ther, The Dark Side of Nation-States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe, translated
by Charlotte Hughes-Kreutzmüller (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014), 224-225.
70. “Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian – Ossetian Conflict, Sochi, 24 June
1992,” United Nations Peacemaker, accessed March 3, 2019.
71. “Agreement on a Cease-Fire in Abkhazia and Arrangement to Monitor its Observance, Sochi,
27 July 1993,” United Nations Peacemaker, accessed March 3, 2019.
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Abkhazia-Georgia buffer zone, Russia was responsible for peacekeeping
between South Ossetia and Georgia. The peacekeeping situation in South
Ossetia became important when considering some of the causes for the RussoGeorgian War. The major result immediately after the ceasefires was that
Abkhazia and South Ossetia became de facto independent states, but de jure
recognized as Georgian territory. The tension in the region, much like most interstate ethnic conflicts seen around the world, remain sensitive for many years
afterward.
While Putin’s ascendancy to power in the 2000s altered the status quo
between Georgia and Russia, significant transitions in Georgia were more
profound and ultimately changed the course of international relations in the
region. In 2003, the Georgian presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze was met with
mass protests following unfair parliamentary elections and extensive corruption
within the government.72 These peaceful, nonviolent protests were led by Mikhail
Saakashvili, a pro-Western opposition leader to the Shevardnadze regime. In the
Rose Revolution, Georgia shed itself of its Soviet-defined and contemporary
Russian-oriented government in favor of closer ties with the West, fundamentally
expressed by interest in NATO membership and accession to the European

72. Shevardnadze was former General Secretary for the Georgian Communist Party from 19721985, leading several anti-corruption campaigns and reforming the Georgian economy. However,
he was more known globally from his tenure as the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Soviet
Union from 1985-1991, where he fought against anti-Gorbachev hardliners in pursuit of more
sensible foreign policy, such as withdrawing from Eastern Europe.
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Union.73 Fresh elections in 2004 saw the Saakashvili become President of
Georgia and his party United National Movement obtaining a majority in the
Georgian Parliament. The new government sought to reintegrate the lost
republics in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, an issue that needed to eventually be
rectified if seeking membership status of NATO or the EU. Likely not
coincidental, Saakashvili’s election to President in 2004 happened in the same
year as the single biggest enlargement of the EU in its history. In one year alone,
ten countries joined the EU, with seven being former members of the Eastern
Bloc (see Figure 4). In addition to joining the EU, the ardently anti-Russian Baltic
states also signed up for NATO, the first time Russia proper shared a land border
with NATO.74

73. These so-called ‘color revolutions’ also took place amongst other former Soviet republics,
including Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. A big concern of Putin was Russia having a color revolution of
his own, which is just one motivating factor for scrupulous maintenance of high popularity and
suppression of any dissent.
74. Excluding the border with Kaliningrad (a Russian exclave) and Poland, who joined NATO in
1999.
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Figure 4. Enlargement of the European Union, 1973-2013.75

This was the larger geopolitical context behind the 2008 Russo-Georgian
War. At the regional level, tensions would incrementally escalate between the
Russians and Georgians, as well between the South Ossetia and Georgia in the
mid-2000s. The opposing Georgian-backed leadership within South Ossetia
signaled that Russian recognition of South Ossetia would mean a return to war.
Things would come to a head when South Ossetian leader Eduard Koikoty
expressed his desire to be recognized and annexed by Russia that in July

75. Not shown in figure: East Germany (1990).
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2008.76 Furthermore, tensions were exacerbated by attacks on police forces from
South Ossetia and Georgia. In the first few days of August, women and children
were evacuated to locations in the immediate North. Initial media reports alleged
that shelling was started first by the South Ossetian separatists and Georgia
retaliated by bombing the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali. Russian
interference was also alleged before August 8. Later, these allegations turned out
to not be the case, first in cables leaked by WikiLeaks, and further confirmed in
an independent fact-finding report funded by the European Union.77 On the
contrary, Georgia was deemed responsible for firing first by bombing separatistcontrolled areas on the night of August 7, 2008. Also important was that the
Russian government was not intent on going to war; at the time of war breaking
out, Medvedev was in Belgium and Putin was at the opening ceremony of the
Summer Olympic games. However, Russia was very prepared if war with
Georgia occurred.
As predicted, Russia used this provocation as the best chance to cripple
the capacity of the Georgian military and move the situation in their favor. While
small advances into South Ossetia were made by Georgian forces on the
morning of August 8, the Russian military advanced from North to South and
pushed them well back into Georgia, nearing Tbilisi by August 11. Atrocities were

76. Hans Mouritzen and Wivel Anders, Explaining Foreign Policy: International Diplomacy and the
Russo-Georgian War, (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), 59.
77. See the downloads for the full International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia
(IIFFMCG) report, Volumes I to III, at
http://www.mpil.de/en/pub/publications/archive/independent_international_fact.cfm
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committed by both sides.78 A second front was opened on the Black Sea and
through Abkhazia. On August 12, a ceasefire was successfully put into effect.
The agreement essentially ended the fighting, and Russian forces had to
withdraw back into Abkhazia and South Ossetia (see Figure 5). The brevity of
this war cannot be stated enough; however it had major implications on the
trajectory of EU (also nominally NATO) expansion and its role in international
relations.

Figure 5. Map of Georgia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 2019.

78. Ian Traynor, “Russia and Georgia set to share blame for South Ossetia conflict,” The
Guardian, last modified 30 September 2009.
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The Russo-Georgian War, while being a minor skirmish with limited
casualties, concluded with the Russians emerging with more victories than any
other participant. The Georgian military and infrastructure were decimated, thus
stopping the expansion of NATO into Georgia and the South Caucasus. As
discussed in previous chapters, the backbone for defense of the EU is NATO; EU
accession of Georgia was politically and geographically distant. Russia gained
more of a foothold in the Black Sea and built military installations in the two
breakaway republics, both officially recognized by Russia soon after the war.
Domestic approval of the Russian government skyrocketed. The war taught
Russian leadership, primarily Putin, that opportunities should be taken under the
best possible moment, so much as to not risk full out war with the other nuclear
powers, but making an impact large enough to expand Russian interests abroad
and boost his popularity at home. Also important was the co-opting of Westernstyle geopolitical strategy and history of military interventions with the result of
turning it against them. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that the
bombing of South Ossetians in Tskhinvali by the Georgians was comparable to
the history of genocide and course of contemporary action surrounding Kosovo,
and was deserving of Russian involvement to stop the alleged genocide from
taking place:
This situation has undergone dramatic development for 17 years now. For
17 years the Russian Federation has been carrying out a peacekeeping
mission, helping to maintain peace and calm there, preventing the killings
that have taken place there since the start of the 1990s, and trying to
preserve the unity of the Georgian state. But the aggression and genocide
unleashed by the Saakashvili regime have changed the situation. Our
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main mission was to prevent a humanitarian disaster and save the lives of
people for whom we are responsible, all the more so as many of them are
Russian citizens. We therefore had no choice but to take the decision to
recognise these two subjects of international law as independent states.
We have taken the same course of action as other countries took with
regard to Kosovo and a number of similar problems.79
The logic stated by Medvedev was characteristic of Putin’s approach to foreign
affairs, and Medvedev’s presidency had virtually no effect on the political
contiguity of this worldview. It would not expire with the end of the 2008 RussoGeorgian War, but only strengthen into the 2010s.
As a blanket statement, the European Union did not succeed in this
situation, but it did not necessarily fail either. While having the appearance of a
major economic and political power, the EU alone lacked the authority or military
prowess to intervene in the negotiation process. The EU had a foreign policy – in
this case, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) that included Georgia – but
did not have the military to protect its interests. A fundamental component to
diplomacy is having a military force, otherwise what country would take the EU
seriously? Additionally, Georgia was not a member of the EU or NATO, therefore
there was no clear international justification to become involved militarily. The
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana
did communicate his worry to both foreign ministers from Russia and Georgia,
but note his deference to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and the international community:

79. Dmitry Medvedev, “Interview with BBC Television, Sochi, 26 August 2008,” President of
Russia, last accessed March 1, 2018.
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I am deeply concerned over the dramatic situation in Georgia and I
deplore the loss of human lives and the suffering inflicted on the civilian
population. I spoke with Sergey Lavrov and Eka Tkeshelashvili and called
on both to spare no efforts to obtain an immediate cease-fire. We will
continue to work relentlessly with the parties and the international
community, in particular the OSCE, to help find a peaceful way out of the
crisis.80

However, during the time of the war, the Treaty of Lisbon was still not in effect
until 2009, which provided new provisions that expanded the powers of the High
Representative. Thus, French President Nicolas Sarkozy entered the fray and
brokered the ceasefire deal on behalf of “Europe.” While Sarkozy was the current
President of the European Council that was constantly on rotation, it is unclear if
he was representing the EU, France, or France’s description of a ‘European’
foreign policy. The radical position held by some was that he was solely acting as
the French President and the EU took a back seat. One of the few to articulate
this in the European Parliament at the time was Nigel Farage:
Mr. President, I address my remarks to the President-in-Office of the
Council. President Sarkozy, it was your own energy, dynamism and
initiative that sent you off to Georgia and Russia to try and broker a deal.
You did it off your own bat. You were not acting on behalf of the European
Union. It is a delusion if anybody in this place thinks you were. There had
been no Council meeting, there was no resolution and there was no
mandate. You did it as the French President, and well done to you.81
Sarkozy responded to, or rather dismissed, Farage’s comments:
Mr. Farage, I did not have a mandate – that is undeniable – but, quite
frankly, neither did the Russian troops when they entered Georgia. You
80. Javier Solana, “EU High Representative for the CFSP calls for urgent efforts to end the
violence in South Ossetia, Brussels, 8 August 2008,” Council of the European Union, last
accessed March 1, 2019.
81. Nigel Farage, Plenary Debate in the European Parliament, 21 October 2008, Strasbourg,
European Parliament, last modified 29 October 2009.
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are one of those people who, for years, have denounced Europe for a lack
of political will. I had a choice: I could ask for everybody’s opinions and
take no action, or act and then check whether the others agreed. I prefer
action.82
Regardless, it is a debate on whether negotiations were truly handled by the EU.
President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso accompanied
Sarkozy in his talks with Medvedev, but Sarkozy received the credit and criticism
for the negotiated deal. It is also rather interesting that Sarkozy, a proponent for a
‘Mediterranean Union’ to prevent certain countries from joining the EU, was
called upon to negotiate this ceasefire deal that would salvage a country outside
the EU. Sarkozy was a known opponent to Georgian membership of NATO.83
The response to the Russo-Georgian War, regardless of French or European
political standing, was done by Sarkozy, the President of an intergovernmental
institution of the EU, and without a mandate from any other EU institution or
national government. What other option was there? There was clearly none, but
this example of diplomacy is indicative that the EU aggressively pursued
expansion but did nothing to aggressively defend it.
The conclusion of the Russo-Georgian War was just a taste of what was
to come as the EU focused itself on expanding into the outer fringes of the
Russian sphere. For Putin, the 2004 expansion into the Baltics was enough.
Putin was not willing to allow Ukraine, who shares a fairly large border with

82. Nicolas Sarkozy, Plenary Debate in the European Parliament, 21 October 2008, Strasbourg,
European Parliament, last modified 29 October 2009.
83. Mark Tran, “Enter Sarkozy the peacemaker,” The Guardian, last modified August 12, 2008.
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Russia and has a sizeable Russian linguistic minority, succumb to what he
viewed as unjustified ‘imperialist’ expansion from the West. The crisis in Ukraine
from early 2013, 2014, and beyond was a repeat of the kind of themes
surrounding the Russo-Georgian War, but different circumstances allowed the
conflict to drag on eternally with no clear solution. Russia took a more active and
immediate role in perpetuating its presence in Ukraine. Compared to the alreadyexistent ethnic conflict in Georgia that saw a quick, practical solution to end the
war, the conflict in the Ukraine will attempt to copy the template of inter-ethnic
conflict in Georgia but involve more complex, ideologically motivated, and
artificially induced methodology to contest EU expansion.

The Ukrainian Euromaidan and the Russian Response
The crisis that unfolded in Ukraine is arguably a repeat of the Georgia
debacle in 2008, but should be considered fundamentally different in its
ambiguous outcome and long-term impression on the European continent. The
situation in Ukraine beginning in early 2013 was the second episode of Russian
involvement, and similarly to Georgia, there is a specific chain of circumstances
that occurred over a period of about a decade. Putin’s motivations for interfering
in Ukraine are quite clear, but several vital alterations in his strategy should be
noted and are important in understanding why the conflict at the time of this
thesis’ publication is still unresolved.
Ukraine, similar to Georgia and other former Soviet republics, has a postindependence history of egregious kleptocratic governance, electoral fraud, and
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the circumvention of legal and economic systems. The wave of protests that hit
Georgia in their 2003 Rose Revolution that encouraged Western-style
liberalization and economic reforms, also had the same impact in Ukraine in their
2004 Orange Revolution. The Orange Revolution, which was triggered by an
ambiguous second round presidential election result between Viktor Lushchenko
and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, was a period of peaceful protests and
demonstrations against the government’s handling of the election. President
Leonid Kuchma and his government backed by parliamentary support from
Yanukovych were alleged to have fixed the election against Lushchenko. This
was predominantly the case, both in the media coverage and actual election
processes.84
Lushchenko, despite his status as an established insider of the government brief
tenure as Prime Minister, was more inclined to support closer ties with the West,
including NATO membership and initiation of the process toward EU accession.
His electoral base consisted of mainly the Ukrainian-speaking, Western oblasts
of Ukraine.85 Yanukovych, like Lushchenko, was also well established within the
apparatus of Kuchma, but held more power and influence as Prime Minister. He
was viewed more positively by Russia and was more in line with Kuchma’s
orientation on positioning Ukraine between Russia and the West. However,
Yanukovych was not as charismatic compared to Lushchenko, and it would take

84. Lincoln Abraham Mitchell, The Color Revolutions, 1st ed., (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 49-51.
85. Ibid.
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an extraordinary amount of weight to produce a result with Yanukovych as the
winner in a second round.86 Ukraine was far from a liberal democracy already,
but the reaction to this election via Orange Revolution was indicative to how
much the Ukrainian kleptocracy was willing to risk in order to put one of their
cronies in power.
Perhaps the only aspect of the Orange Revolution worth mentioning was
that it was largely peaceful and ensured that a fraudulent election would be
annulled and rerun with a proper outcome. Lushchenko was not out of the
woods, and Ukraine was not going to radically transform out of its post-Soviet
shell. Internal division between the victorious parties of the Orange Revolution
and more of the corruption and baggage from the Kuchma years disrupted the
stability of the Ukrainian government. This is one condition that made
Euromaidan in 2014 unavoidable: instability. The average Ukraine citizen wished
nothing more than stability, whether it be in one direction toward the West and
EU, or toward Russia. The differences between the two electoral spheres
between the Western oblasts and the South and East oblasts would continue
well past the 2004 election. The presidential election in 2010 resulted in
Yanukovych winning based not on popularity among the whole country, but the
electoral math needed for more than half of the votes coming from his electoral
and regional base in the East and South. This was the second condition that

86. Lincoln Abraham Mitchell, The Color Revolutions, 1st ed., (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 49-51.
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made Euromaidan possible; that the Orange Revolution had not succeeded and
the very person the Orange Revolution was intended to oppose took the
presidency. With the presidency secured and a government in the Verkhovna
Rada later confirmed, albeit fraudulently, in 2012, Yanukovych had the political
power necessary to reorient Ukraine’s international standing.
In the most forthright sense, the Euromaidan Revolution that began on 21
November 2013 and ramped up in the early months of 2014, was a continuation
of the many issues demonstrated in the Orange Revolution. The protest began
as a small, peaceful demonstration in Kiev’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti
(Independence Square), protesting Yanukovych’s decision to permanently shelve
the association agreement between the Ukraine and the EU from Russian
pressure.87 In recent years, Russia has had excessive influence over the
Ukrainian economy. One significant example is in natural gas inflows into the
country. Russia has used this as a bargaining chip, most notably in 2010 when
Yanukovych agreed to a 30% reduction in gas prices in exchange for extending
the lease on Russia’s naval base in Crimea.88 This is one component of Putin’s
so-called ‘Special War’ that has been conducted upon not just post-Soviet
countries, but also on the rest of the European continent.89 The alternative for

87. Ian Traynor and Oksana Grytsenko, “Ukraine suspends talks on EU trade pact as Putin wins
tug of war,” The Guardian, last modified 21 November 2013.
88. Luke Harding, “Ukraine extends lease for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet,” The Guardian, last
modified 21 April 2010.
89. Glenn-Iain Steinback, "Russia in Transition: A Political and Social History of the Dissolution of
the Soviet Union, Evolution of Capitalist Reform, and the Creation of Putinism, 1985-2015,”
Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations, California State University, San Bernardino, Paper
158 (2015): 204-205.
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Ukraine, instead of the European Union, was planned entrance into Eurasian
Economic Union (EAEU), Russia’s authoritarian, state-capitalist model for
economic integration, later formalized in 2014.90 Ukraine, not by choice, was
unfortunately the geopolitical location for the clash between these two
supranational organizations. One major consequence of Euromaidan was
aversion from the path toward the EAEU, but as this section will later explain, it
will come at a cost.
By the end of that last week of November, demonstrations were
encouraged by opposition political parties and their leaders, especially using the
Internet and social media (See Figure 6). Online communication and accessible
digital technology played a key role in the development of the Euromaidan
protests, both in the Ukraine and the coverage abroad.

90. The EAEU is undoubtedly Putin’s resurrection the Cold War-era ‘Comecon’ economic area
under clear domination from the Soviet Union, however the fundamental difference here is
‘appearance.’ EAEU institutions are similarly structured to the EU, except as camouflage for
Putin’s agenda.
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Figure 6. Tweet from Arseniy Yatsenyuk on 21 November 2013.91

The violence from the police upon the growing crowds of Ukrainians in the
Maidan, and vice-versa only compounded the protests. In the end, they were a
clear channel for the decades of frustration with Ukraine’s oligarchic government
structure and the absence of the rule of law.92 This was perhaps most evident in
the mainly pro-European opposition leaders and their supporters coordinating
revolutionary and defensive efforts with ultranationalists and outright fascists that,
surprisingly to some observers, hate Russia.93 The main objective was to remove
Yanukovych from power, which did happen only after months of police brutality
against the revolutionaries in Kiev and the situation in Ukraine became too

91. Translation reads: “All at #Euromaidan! Yanukovych does not understand any other language
except Maidan. So we have to show that the power is us! Join!” Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Twitter Post,
November 21, 2013, 1:22 AM.
92. Timothy Snyder, "Integration and Disintegration: Europe, Ukraine, and the World," Slavic
Review 74, no. 4 (2015): 703.
93. The ultranationalists in Ukraine, unlike several Eurosceptic, radical right-wing to far-right
parties in Europe such as the Rassemblement National (formerly Front National) in France and
others, see Russia as the clear enemy and the Ukrainian oligarchs as enablers of Russian
influence over Ukrainian sovereignty.
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dangerous for him to continue as President. Not surprisingly, the ideologically
and linguistically divided nature of Ukraine led to a counterrevolution in areas that
statistically identify more as Russian than Ukrainian: the Donbas and Crimea.
Russia took advantage of this opportunity to invade Ukraine.
Once Yanukovych abdicated his position as President, Russia invaded
Crimea and heavily assisted separatists (some of whom were Russian nationals)
in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine.94 While the takeover of Crimea was
rather seamless, the Donbas became an essential stalemate between Russian
military-backed separatists and the Ukrainian military. Comparable to the
situation in Georgia, this war became a foreign policy issue largely of Russian
creation. From Putin’s perspective, a full-blown invasion of Ukraine was not a
card he could play for fiscal reasons and to not provoke an actual war with
Western powers. Sanctions from the international community was a price he
could pay, or indeed, circumvent completely. By keeping the Donbas as an
ambiguous zone of control for a fiscally low-cost, perpetual war, Putin can
preserve European participation in his diplomatic game, or indeed, his Special
War.95

94. The Donbas region is known as geographically the basin that contains the Donets River, but
politically are considered the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts of Ukraine. The names of the two de
facto independent states are the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) in the West and the Luhansk
People’s Republic (LPR) in the East (see Figure 7).
95. Glenn-Iain Steinback, “Russia in Transition,” 204-205.
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Figure 7. Map of Ukraine with Crimea and Separatist Republics, 2019.

As stated previously, the European and more broad international response
was condemnation of the annexation of Crimea and interference in the Donbas. It
is in Putin’s better interest in his geopolitical strategy to hold off on recognizing
the separatist republics and play that card when the least risky opportunity
arises. Recognition of Donbas as separate from Ukraine undermines his longterm strategy to keep Ukraine contested as long as possible. Thus, what was the
EU to do about the crisis? The successor to Javier Solana as the EU High
Representative was Catharine Ashton, serving from 2009 to 2014.

61

Notwithstanding her meetings with the “stakeholders,” her efforts came across as
weak, indecisive, and underwhelming.96
We want to underline very clearly that there is still time to avoid a negative
spiral and to reverse current developments. We call on the Russian
leadership not to take steps to annex Crimea and instead to take steps to
deescalate this crisis.97
Ashton’s incompetence in the Ukraine situation might be the result of general
inexperience with diplomacy, which was one point of critique of her 2009
appointment. On the other hand, she was able to reconcile Serbia and Kosovo in
their relations, which ironically is one pillar of disgust in Putin’s worldview.98
There was to be no reversal and Putin was not going give up Crimea on his own
will, both for practical reasons as well as the popularity boost he received from
the annexation. It should always be recalled that Putin is a realist, compared to
the idealist EU. Under the same breath of those comments from High
Representative Ashton, most of the action done on behalf of the EU in this
situation was in economic sanctions put on Russia throughout 2014.99 As stated
beforehand, Putin was willing to bear the cost of sanctions if that meant he could
keep Ukraine contested via the occupation of Crimea. Economic sanctions and

96. Ashton literally used the term ‘stakeholders’ in one of her statements, which is arguably a
poor choice of language for resolving issues surrounding sovereignty and borders. Under the
research conducted, finding the specific statement was quite difficult; the link to the statement
was broken and only by obtaining an Internet-archived version was the document retrieved. See
Catharine Ashton, “Statement by EU High Representative Catharine Ashton on the developments
in Ukraine’s Crimea,” European External Action Service, 1 March 2014.
97. Catharine Ashton, “3304th Council Meeting Press Release Main Results of the Council,
Ukraine,” Council of the European Union, 17 March 2014, 2.
98. Piotr Smolar, “Serbia and Kosovo sign historic agreement,” The Guardian, last modified 30
April 2013.
99. Catharine Ashton, “3304th Council Meeting Press Release Main Results of the Council,
Ukraine,” Council of the European Union, 17 March 2014, 2.
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diplomatic pressure on Russia, and assistance to the Ukrainian government were
the only options the EU pursued.100 This may be the reason why calls for a
European Army have grown since then (see Figure 8). While Crimea under firm
Russian control via the succession of military occupation, questionable
referenda, and annexation as part of the Russian Federation, the conflict in the
Donbas continued to persist.

Figure 8. Tweet from Jean-Claude Juncker on 20 May 2014.101

The War in Donbas closely resembled the Abkhazian and South Ossetian
conflicts in Georgia, both in execution and in attempted resolution by European
leaders. Negotiations for the first Minsk Protocol (Minsk I) were conducted
between Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE, and unofficially the separatist leaders from
Donetsk and Luhansk. Minsk I called for a slew of ceasefire provisions, more
local control of separatist areas, and restrictions on foreign involvement through
100. “EU Restrictive Measures,” Council of the European Union, 29 April 2014, 1.
101. Jean-Claude Juncker, Twitter Post, May 20, 2014, 1:16 PM.
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military assistance or equipment.102 Separatists broke the agreement and fighting
started once again. There appears to be a relationship between the similar timing
of the betrayal of Minsk I and the ratification of the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement in the week following the first Minsk summit. Fighting continued and
the line of control between the Ukrainian military and separatists became more
violent with more casualties.
The second Minsk Summit in February 2015 intended to once again
resolve the conflict, this time on a multilateral basis including participation from
President Lukashenko of Belarus, President Hollande of France, Chancellor
Merkel of Germany, President Putin of Russia, and President Poroshenko of
Ukraine. The agreement, known as Minsk II, included many provisions of Minsk I,
but also expanded to address humanitarian issues, respect of Ukrainian
sovereignty, and vague promises for more autonomy for the separatist-controlled
areas.103 Despite these two peace arrangements, the fighting in Donbas
continued. Complex issues understandably require complex resolutions. The
passive role of the EU in the Donbas situation likely compounds the crisis, but at
the same time diplomatic efforts might not be taken seriously. They were forced
to relegate that diplomatic responsibility to the OSCE, a non-EU but European
affiliated intergovernmental organization. Instead, the EU has prioritized in
actively assisting the Ukrainian government on their way toward potential
102. “Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group (Minsk Agreement),
9 September 2014,” United Nations Peacemaker, accessed March 5, 2019.
103. “Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, 12 February 2015,”
United Nations Peacemaker, accessed March 5, 2019.
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accession. This assistance was clear in the ratification of the EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement throughout 2015 and 2016, which allowed Ukraine
access to the European common market. There is change occurring in EU
attitudes toward Russia. Compared to her unimpressive predecessor, High
Representative Frederica Mogherini appears to be more nuanced and active in
her approach to EU-Russian relations. The EU has long been an adversary of
Russia, while at the same time individual countries have built bilateral
relationships with Putin. EU leaders will quickly realize that Russia is needed for
economic and energy cooperation, thus it is important to have some compromise
with Russia in the near future. Nevertheless, as long as each side remains
entrenched in their negotiating positions, Ukraine will continue to go down the
road of being designated as a perpetual frozen territorial conflict, much like
Kashmir between India and Pakistan.
For now, Putin’s strategy has been successful in the Ukraine and Georgia.
The forced establishment of pro-Russian ‘gray zones’ in several candidate
countries for EU accession or NATO membership complicates processes related
to joining these intergovernmental organizations and alliances.104 Ukraine, while
an EU free trade associate, will not have the ability to join NATO in the near
future as long as the situation remains the status quo in Donbas. Full-fledged

104. The term ‘gray zone’ was used in an academic collaboration on the less-talked about
peoples who live on the borderlands of the European Union and in these internationally
unrecognized territories. The primary inspiration for the term was Holocaust survivor Primo Levi’s
categorization for those not entirely complicit with or victimized by the Nazi agenda. See Ida
Harboe Knudsen, et. al. Ethnographies of Grey Zones in Eastern Europe: Relations, Borders and
Invisibilities. (London: Anthem Press, 2015).
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Ukrainian EU membership seems less likely for the time being, especially since
oligarchs maintain their influence on the government despite the Euromaidan.
While the geopolitical situation on the EU periphery has transformed, the next
and final chapter of this thesis will examine political dissent of the EU that was
brewing on the domestic front and culminated in the United Kingdom leaving the
EU project altogether, which has been the largest shakeup in Europe since 1991.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
OPPOSING THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE MARRIAGE OF
EUROSCEPTICISM AND POPULISM
As demonstrated throughout this thesis, the European Union is not without
its critics, some of whom are ironically elected members of the European
Parliament. The intricacies of opposition politics became as complex as the
European Union. As the EU project marched towards an ever closer union and
the democratic deficit continued to widen since passage of Maastricht in 1992,
the volume of the dissent became louder and more plentiful. This section is
dedicated to analysis of the positions of those opposed to union, and how they
were able to put pressure on their national governments and the EU under times
of crisis.
While the history outlined here is primarily focused on the periodization
following 2008, it should be remembered, and as alluded to in Chapter One, that
the EU has a mixed track record with referendums since Maastricht. Rejection of
European institutions in popular referenda was quite common, and from most
surprising member states. Most referenced by Eurosceptics, the defeat of the
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (European Constitution) in 2005 by
France and the Netherlands, two founding members of the ECSC, was a pivotal
moment in European integration. If it had been implemented, the Constitution
would have been a significant step toward federalization of the European Union
and the gradual abandonment of the ‘treaty’ framework that led the integration
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process in the past. Instead, the French and Dutch referendums indicated that a
significant portion of Europeans were not willing to make that transition. After the
two ‘no’ results, the brakes were applied on the Constitution and all future
referendums regarding the Constitution were cancelled. It would be futile to
proceed with referendums in the rest of the EU when two substantial members
had rejected the matter.
In contrast to the structural framework of the European Constitution,
further integration had no other option but to continue down the previously
utilized treaty framework and more emphasis was placed upon ratification
through national legislatures as opposed to national electorates. This culminated
in the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, which allowed specific
institutional reforms that would have been implemented had the Constitution
been ratified in 2005.105 Specifically, it would remove the processes that would
require referendums for amendments to the Rome or Maastricht treaties. Lisbon
was decisively the triumph of intergovernmentalism in the EU. It was ratified quite
easily by all member states with the exception of the referendum in Ireland,
which despite its rejection in the first of two attempts, was eventually approved.
Following the initial ‘no’ vote in Ireland, European leadership did not consign
Lisbon to the same fate of the Constitution. Instead, a second referendum in
Ireland was called after minor changes were made to the text of the Irish

105. “Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007,” Official Journal of the European
Union C306 (2007): 1-271.
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Constitution that allowed ratification of Lisbon. This sequence of rejections and
subsequent maneuverings around rejections are seen by some Eurosceptics as
a ‘betrayal of democracy.’ Nigel Farage had made this point clear time and time
again in the European Parliament about how the EU leaders have a particular
issue with referendums that do not go their way:
Madam President, nobody else has said it, but I will: well done the Irish!
And yet, before the official result was out, there was Mr. Barroso, holding
a press conference in Brussels, looking as shifty and as dishonest as
anybody I have ever seen, saying – despite what the rules of the club are
– that the Treaty is not dead and we continue. Frankly, it was a disgusting
display; it was an insult to democracy. It is perfectly clear that the
ratifications should stop now and the implementation of the Treaty should
stop now.106
And after the second referendum, Farage cited that the EU dumped money into
Ireland to ensure the likelihood of a ‘yes’ vote:
Mr. President, well, it is all terribly simple really, isn’t it? We have had one
vote against the Treaty in Ireland and one vote for the Treaty in Ireland, so
if we have any sort of sporting sense, we ought to make this the best of
three; but the difference is that with a third referendum, let’s make it a free
and a fair referendum. Because what has happened in Ireland most
certainly is not that! In fact, I hope you are all very proud of yourselves
because what you have done is you have taken the littlest boy in the
playground, got him into the corner and given him a good kicking. This is a
victory for the bully boys; it is a victory for big money and a victory for
bureaucrats. The whole thing was a travesty!107
The controversy surrounding the European Constitution and Treaty of
Lisbon is just one instance of dispute for Eurosceptics in the European
Parliament. However, as preliminarily recognized in Chapter One and Two,

106. Nigel Farage, Preparation of the European Council following the Irish referendum (debate),
18 June 2008, Strasbourg, European Parliament, last modified 21 October 2008.
107. Nigel Farage, Preparation of the European Council following the Irish referendum (debate), 7
October 2009, Brussels, European Parliament, last modified 2 December 2009.

69

critical opposition to the EU appears in many different forms and from different
member states – referendums are just one avenue. This chapter aims to explain
the phenomenon of Euroscepticism as a political force and how its marriage with
populism became effective in precipitating change (or none at all) within the
European Union.

Identifying Eurosceptics and Populists
In Chapter One, this thesis identified French President Charles de Gaulle
and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as two significant voices that
exemplified skepticism toward the European Union as it expanded into its
present-day institutional scope and sequence. The disparate but like-minded
perspectives of these two individuals are characteristic of Euroscepticism itself.
De Gaulle can be considered as an inward Eurosceptic; a stubborn
intergovernmentalist and champion of French superiority within the European
project. Thatcher, the opposite, was more or less an outward Eurosceptic;
wishing to defend British interests from intrusion from a growing European
bureaucracy.108 The complexity of just these two individuals’ perspectives is only
scratching the surface, as they both were politically on the right-wing and were
fundamentally well-recognized members of the established political order.
Sincere opposition to the European Union, termed Euroscepticism, would only

108. The inward-outward labels were realized by several of the authors whose pieces appeared
in Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dür, Key Controversies in European Integration, (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
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gain steam just as Thatcher was on her way out in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Euroscepticism is regarded as a catch-all, comprehensive term to
describe a distinct type of skepticism and criticism of the European Union and its
institutions and the overall trajectory of European integration.
Identification of anything usually requires determining what it is not. If
Euroscepticism was expanded to include any criticism of the European Union,
this would arguably comprise some of the most enthusiastic, marginally fanatical,
supporters of the EU who believe action on the European level has not gone far
enough. This would include many individuals in the upper echelons of European
politics, including some in the European Parliament. Former Prime Minister of
Belgium and leader of the Liberal group in the European Parliament, Guy
Verhofstadt, epitomizes this class of political actors, as seen in just one fiery
speech in the European Parliament:
Indeed, ladies and gentlemen, I think that either Europe will become
federal or it will cease to exist. The choice is as simple as that. We must
stop being afraid of words and afraid of using the word ‘federal’ when we
talk about the future of Europe. It is, in fact, a federal solution that is
needed, a solution that will give us a real economic government, which we
need, real democratic control, which we do not have at the moment, a real
European treasury and a real federal budget, and, why not, in the future, a
solution that will lead us one day towards a real European army. We have
no choice. European federalism is the only way of integrating ourselves
into globalisation, the only way of negotiating on an equal footing and the
only way of maintaining our economic and political role. It is also the only
way of protecting our social model in Europe.109

109. Guy Verhofstadt, Future of Europe (debate), 9 May 2012, Brussels, European Parliament,
last modified 9 May 2012.
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Verhofstadt has proved to be a foremost proponent of increased integration and
equally the most willing to challenge Eurosceptics in many European Parliament
sessions, often debating the likes of Nigel Farage. It would be a miscalculation to
group these two individuals, Verhofstadt and Farage, as belonging to the same
category of politicians. For these reasons, this class of individuals who are
positive critics of the EU cannot be considered as Eurosceptics.
Euroscepticism is dynamic in that it is fundamentally both a catch-all term
and politically exists as a profoundly divided cohort in European politics. In the
broadest sense possible, Eurosceptics on the right tend to focus on issues
related to culture or national sovereignty, such as immigration. The EU’s stance
on free movement of peoples has unmistakably spawned more Euroscepticism
on the right. On the other hand, Eurosceptics on left commonly emphasize
economic issues related to how, for instance, the EU facilitates neoliberal
interpretations of free market capitalism and profoundly caters to the interests of
multinational corporations. Even this portrayal of ideological differences is
problematic, as many Eurosceptics on the right quite often make sovereignty
arguments in economic terms, such as criticism of the EU’s monopoly on free
trade arrangements with foreign powers. Likewise, some Eurosceptics on the left
see the EU as a threat to the effectiveness of the nation-state social democratic
welfare systems. These divisions are apparent in the European Parliament,
where to their disadvantage Eurosceptic groups lack cohesion even as their
numbers grow (see Figure 9).
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Figure 9. Composition of the First Session of the 2014-2019 European
Parliament.110

Even Eurosceptics on the right, who are more numerous and louder than
those on the left, have the most divisions in the European Parliament. 111 At the
beginning of the 2014-2019 European Parliament, the two biggest groups on the
right who are considered Eurosceptic, the European Conservatives and
Reformists (ECR) and the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD)
group, are separate only because of longstanding differences on how to

110. “Results of the 2014 European elections, 2014 opening session,” European Parliament, last
modified January 7, 2014.
111. For the most part and with mixed perspectives on European integration, left wing
Eurosceptics reside in the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL). For the purposes
of this thesis’ argument, focus will not be directed on this group.
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approach the EU.112 Divisions within individual groups regardless of their political
orientation also occur. The Hungarian political party Fidesz led by Viktor Orbán is
a member of the federalist center-right European People’s Party, yet hardly
subscribes to that group’s stance on European integration. Orbán and his party
only continued to exist within that group to take advantage of its influence in EU
government.113 More often than in national parliaments, Members of European
Parliament (MEPs) are not always tied down to groups and sometimes defect to
others, thus slightly altering the composition of the European Parliament between
elections. New groups may form. In 2015, a sizeable portion of the Non-Iscrits,
which make up MEPs that do not belong to any group, formed a new Eurosceptic
group called Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) not depicted in Figure 9.114
Under the leadership of Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders and their respective
French and Dutch political parties represented in the European Parliament, the
ENF group comprised several right-wing to far-right MEPs from across Europe.
The 2014 European Parliament was the most Eurosceptic in the 35 years
of its history, mainly as a result of the low turnout described in Chapter One, but
also the Eurozone crisis described in Chapter Two. Despite these divisions,

112. The ECR and EFDD groups are also not unified due to their leadership, which to a degree
mirrors political division on the right in the United Kingdom. ECR was founded following the 2009
European Parliament election. ECR was led in the 2014-2019 European Parliament by the British
Conservative Syed Kamall, while the EFDD was led by UK Independence Party (UKIP) leader
Nigel Farage. This division will be made clearer later in this chapter.
113. As this thesis is being written in early 2019, Fidesz was suspended from the EPP after years
of continued campaign rhetoric against EPP leadership and the domestic policies of Orbán
related to migration issues and rule of law.
114. Alissa F. Rubin, “Far Right Parties Form Coalition in European Parliament,” New York
Times, last modified June 16, 2015.
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Eurosceptics have been able to grow within the European Parliament. If
Euroscepticism is a metaphorical bludgeon to EU politics, the populism displayed
often by Eurosceptics is a vital driving force behind that bludgeon. Populism is
not an ideology, rather it is a campaign strategy; a particular projection of one’s
political beliefs. It is rhetoric that exploits political and socio-economic divisions
within a liberal democracy and reduces politics to ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite.’115
While some who espouse populism would disagree and especially self-identified
right-wing populists, populism mimics the economic basis of Marxism that pits the
proletariat against the bourgeoisie.116 While populists are not calling for violent
revolution per se, they are messengers of radical interpretations of liberal
democracy and attempt to convey prescriptions to advance change. The most
irrational component of populism, which alludes to the same degree in criticism of
Marxism, is the fact that ‘the people’ are just not well-defined just as ‘the
proletariat.’ Who are ‘the people’ when not all people within the electorate
support a populist party? This is just one intellectual exercise in populist logic and
how it functions in Western liberal democracies. Regardless of its apparent
fallacies and similarly its critics, populists gain power when traditional political
forces fail.

115. For a contemporary and well-rounded definition of the populism discussed in this thesis, see
Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy,
(Penguin Random House, 2018).
116. The forgotten, but arguably best example for contemporary populism resides with the rise of
the Dutch academic turned politician Pim Fortuyn, active the early 2000s Dutch politics. He is
interesting not just for his ability to interact effectively with the media to promote his antiestablishment, anti-immigrant agenda. Before his rise, he was an avowed Marxist and member of
the Dutch Labor Party.
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In the case of Eurosceptics, this already effective populist strategy is
compounded by the fact that the European project is relatively young, openended, and encourages division between its member states. Populist rhetoric fits
the structure of the EU perfectly, especially at times of crisis where both national
and EU institutions are ineffective. Eurosceptics are able to voice concerns about
how ‘the elites’ of the EU in Brussels are detached from the interests of ‘the
people.’ The marriage of Euroscepticism, a rather mundane approach to
European politics, with populism proved to be a politically lethal force to the
political establishment in times of crisis. With respect to the EU, Eurosceptic
right-wing populists tend to have more success than their left-wing counterparts
because the EU is perceived as a threat to national sovereignty, a fact that plays
more intensely to the interests of the political right. The European project since
its beginning has existed to keep its members pinned down.117 Contrary to some
observers’ views that contemporary populism is something brand new resulting
from the post-2008 crises, right-wing populists have existed and been successful
in Europe for quite a long time in the postwar period (see in Table 4). Populism is
not a new phenomenon nor a long-standing European political tradition.

117. For example, the ECSC and Common Market was intended to keep the Germans in check in
the immediate postwar years. Later on, Germany promised to sacrifice its national currency for a
European currency in exchange for German reunification in the early 1990s.
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Table 4. Nationally Active and High-Profile Right-Wing Populist Political Parties in
the European Union.118
Country

Political Party

Austria

Freedom Party of Austria

Denmark

Danish People’s Party

Finland
Greece

Finns Party
Independent Greeks

Hungary

Fidesz

Italy

Northern League

Latvia
Lithuania
Netherlands

National Alliance
Order and Justice
Party for Freedom

Poland

Law and Justice

Slovakia

Slovak National Party

Slovenia

Slovenian Democratic Party

Years of Inclusion in
Parliamentary
Governmenta
1970-1971
1983-1986
1999-2006
2001-2007
2015- Present
2015-2017
2015-Present
1998-2002
2010- Present
1994-1996
2001-2006
2008-2011
2011-2015
2012-2016
2010-2012
2005-2007
2015-Present
1992-1998
2006-2010
2016-Present
1990-1996
2004-2008
2012-2013

a. Some parties included in the chart were not historically considered populist, but for the purpose
of demonstrating that these groups existed long before 2008, all years of previous government
participation is shown.

118. The chart only includes governments that were led by or included right-wing populist political
parties before 2016. Chart data was gathered from government websites and corresponding
newspaper articles. Noticeably absent from the chart are the French National Front, UK
Independence Party, and Alternative for Germany, all of which have exerted different forms of
political pressure in their respective democracies before and after 2016. The chart does not
include dissolved political parties.
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A reasonable explanation for the lack of collective wisdom regarding
populism’s relatively effective record could be that it was not truly developed in
the Anglosphere, principally in the United States and United Kingdom, until
recently. In 2016, the United Kingdom referendum on EU membership and the
election of Donald Trump to United States President, with the former contributing
to the conclusion of this chapter and this thesis as a whole, were two ‘shock’
events that put contemporary right-wing populism on the map in those respective
countries. The UK Independence Party, ascendancy of Nigel Farage as a key
political disruptor in British politics, and pressure on the political establishment to
allow a referendum on EU membership are discussed later in this chapter.
Regional differences between right-wing populists are a note of special
interest. It is no accident that most of the countries listed in Table 4 were formerly
governed by communists. Most profoundly in Poland and Hungary, Euroscepticstreaked populism is utilized by powerful parties such as Law and Justice and
Fidesz respectively to assert their desires for more independence within the EU.
At the same time, Poland and Hungary benefit more than others from their EU
membership, thus developing a peculiar relationship with European institutions.
More economically developed EU members such as Austria and the Netherlands
contain right-wing populists that are critical of EU and national stances on cultural
liberalism and relaxed immigration controls. In particular, the Dutch Party for
Freedom led by Geert Wilders, an unapologetic critic of Islam and its
compatibility with Western culture, has such radical positions on immigration and
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assimilation. Wilders and many similar to him will benefit electorally from issues
such as Islamic terrorism both in Europe and abroad. Their highly controversial
perspectives will string together immigration and terrorism issues to attack both
their national governments and European leaders’ supposed incompetency to
secure Europe.
The political parties discussed above were all represented in the
European Parliament groups discussed earlier. They were able to broadcast their
messages in plenary sessions and across alternative forms of communication
such as the Internet and social media. It cannot be stated enough that the
intense globalization of political communication over the past few decades
benefited those who could use it effectively. Whether it be Euromaidan in
Ukraine, or the Arab Spring revolutions in 2010 onward, tools of communication
originally intended for social networking were rapidly adopted as platforms for
political communication. Nevertheless, a demonstrable turning point for
Eurosceptic populist factions occurred in 2015: the year that saw large and
unsustainable amounts of economic migrants and refugees inundate the
European Union. This crisis, which will be briefly described in the following
section, provided terrain for radical political actors to capitalize on the EU’s
indecisiveness..

Turning Point: The European Migrant Crisis
The European Union is no stranger to refugees; a notable example was in
the early 1990s where moderate numbers of them fled persecution and violence
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in the former Yugoslav republics.119 The EU is not unfamiliar to economic
migrants either. One of four pillars of the EEC was to allow the free movement of
persons between member states, as established in the Treaty of Rome in 1957.
The Schengen Treaty in 1985 removed all internal border checks among its
ratifying member states and created an external border check system called
Frontex.120 Large numbers of Europeans from former communist states in search
of better economic opportunities took advantage of these regulations (or lack
thereof) as their countries were accepted in the EU. To its credit, the EU was
able to perfect its internal borders. Geographic proximity and an EU that was
smaller and more cohesive proved to have invaluable advantages in handling
these situations. The proximity of World War II also played a decisive role, as
Germany stepped up to bear the burden of migrants as a means to redeem itself
from its past atrocities. These situations, the Yugoslav crisis and fall of the
communist governments in the East, involved European people as opposed to
people from elsewhere. While there was skepticism from right-wing populists
within countries about the influx of foreigners, these foreigners were, at the very
least, of European origin and national governments responded accordingly.
Immigration and refugee issues were already well established in the political
culture of many EU member states by the end of the 2000s.

119. Henry Kamm, “Yugoslav Refugee Crisis Europe’s Worst Since 40’s,” The New York Times,
July 24, 1992.
120. “Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985,” Official Journal of
the European Communities L239 (2000): 19-62.
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The crisis that should be referred to as the European Migrant-Refugee
Crisis took shape at the beginning of 2013. Observers made the mistake of
identifying it as either a migrant crisis or refugee crisis, when in reality it
encompassed both, which are not the same. All refugees are migrants, but not all
migrants are refugees. In most literature and media coverage of migration issues,
scholars mention push and pull factors. For the purpose of this thesis, this
framework is slightly modified to describe the factors that caused a large volume
of people to leave their countries of origin and the reasons why the EU was not
prepared to receive them.
The push factors, or the reason for the mass volume of people that
evacuated the Middle East and North Africa, is separated between long-term and
short-term factors. The global, long-term trend in migration since the end of
World War II is movement from the global south to global north. Most of the
global south are developing countries with weak governments, unstable
economies, and a high propensity for violence. In many of these countries, wars
have taken place over the course of decades and the flow of refugees has
persisted as long as the wars have continued. Afghan, Palestinian, and Somalian
refugees comprise the vast majority of refugees in recent years.121 While the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has existing
structures to facilitate the settlement of refugees from these specific countries, it

121. “Detections of IBCs,” Frontex: European Border and Coast Guard Agency, last modified
April 3, 2019.
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is largely unsustainable for the sheer scale of the problem. It is not surprising that
many of the refugees that ended up trying to get into Europe were from these
countries.
Short-term factors are the most complex, and ultimately led to some of the
difficulties in how the EU responded. The Arab Spring, or the period of
revolutions in Middle Eastern countries that overthrew several autocratic
dictators, led to the sort of conditions necessary for an unmanageable migration
crisis. While some of these revolutions changed politics in several Middle Eastern
countries, in others the insurgents were either unsuccessful or at odds with each
other in civil wars. Syria became engulfed in a dreadful civil war between the
government of Bashar al-Assad and a wide swath of armed groups. Daesh, or
colloquially known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, was the most radical
group to emerge from the Syrian Civil War. Daesh became responsible for
causing immense suffering upon the peoples within the borderlands of Iraq and
Syria in addition to conducting a professional propaganda campaign that was
responsible for inspiring numerous terrorist attacks around the world. Following
NATO intervention in Libya to assist the overthrow of autocrat Muammar
Ghaddafi, the power vacuum left behind warring rebel factions and what
essentially amounted to a failed state. Libya and Syria served as two potential
points of departure for those migrating to Europe.
A fair perspective is that Europe was unprepared for the crisis as a matter
of geography. As discussed previously, the European Union was able to perfect
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its internal borders through the Treaties. However, external borders of the EU are
immense and complex. The European continent itself is only a small extension of
the larger Eurasian continent; in the most basic sense it is peninsula of
peninsulas.122 The EU land and oceanic borders are most ‘clean’ in the North
and West. The United Kingdom and Ireland are excluded from the Schengen
area, but non-EU members Switzerland, Norway, and several microstates are
participating in Schengen rules (see Figure 10). In the Northeast, the Schengen
Area only borders the four non-EU countries of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and
Moldova. The Balkan Peninsula is the most complex land border configuration in
the whole of the EU, with Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania outside Schengen, but
Greece included. Several former Yugoslav republics are neither in Schengen or
the EU.

122. Tony Judt, A Grand Illusion?: An Essay on Europe, (New York: New York University Press,
2011), 45.
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Figure 10. Map of the Schengen Area Including Non-European Union Member
States, 2016.123

The geographic contours of the Mediterranean Sea form the entire
Southern border of the EU, with the exception of two Spanish holdings in the
African country of Morocco and a small land border between Greece, Bulgaria
and Turkey. The Mediterranean is directly adjacent to the Middle East and just
one step away from sub-Saharan Africa, two of the most violent regions on Earth.
The purpose of the European Neighborhood Policy was not just to send much-

123. The UK and Ireland depicted in red are EU opt-outs of Schengen. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
and Romania shown in gold are candidate EU members for Schengen. Iceland, while not shown,
is also part of the Schengen Area but is not an EU member state. Andorra, located on the border
of France and Spain is the only European microstate not in the Schengen Area.
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needed economic assistance to countries surrounding the EU, but also to keep
favorable relations with their leaders so that Europe did not share borders with
unstable countries. When Libya and Syria fell into disarray, so did their ability to
keep the ‘cork in the bottle’ on the migration from areas that border them.124 It is
fathomable to suggest that the breakdown of diplomatic relations and ongoing
conflict in these two countries intensified the European Migrant-Refugee crisis.
Thus, human traffickers were able to flourish in the Mediterranean (see Figure
11).

124. The phrase ‘cork in the bottle’ is borrowed from Wikileaks founder Julian Assange in a 2016
interview where he described the role Libya played in allowing increased migration from Africa.
The removal of Gaddafi and the subsequent power vacuum allowed Libya to become a failed
state, reaching to the point of a second, lengthy civil war beginning in 2014. Assange used this
phrase in his larger criticism of 2011 NATO intervention in Libya to remove Gaddafi, but it
illustrated the bigger picture of why migration existed in the central Mediterranean Sea, arguably
the most dangerous route.
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Figure 11. Illegal Border Crossings (IBCs) on the Eastern Mediterranean Route,
2008-2016.125

If it was not geography that predestined Europe and the EU to have this
sort of crisis, it was the inconsistency of the messages coming from within the
European Union. Common asylum policy has been a matter of debate between
old and new member states over the course of many decades and many different
situations. Dublin III Regulations signed by most EU members in 2013 governed

125. Eastern Mediterranean Route is defined by Frontex as land and sea arrivals in the Eastern
Aegean Sea and Greek islands. On their website, data from other routes is available, but are
incredibly miniscule compared to the Eastern Mediterranean. “Migratory Routes, Eastern
Mediterranean Route, Trends prior to 2017,” Frontex: European Border and Coast Guard Agency,
accessed 5 April 2019.
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asylum applications, stating that a refugee must apply in the first EU country they
arrive.126 When Germany under the directives of Chancellor Angela Merkel
suspended these rules in September 2015, countries on the external border of
the Schengen Area and the EU constructed fences along those external borders.
Hungary was the most notable example. Viktor Orbán was unwilling to capitulate
to German demands to allow arrivals to move through Hungary without
registration, a violation of the Dublin arrangements. The border fence was
portrayed as Orbán’s so-called ‘strategy’ to not allow arrivals to settle in Hungary
in defense of his position on European and Hungarian culture. He defended the
fencing in a press conference as a measured response to protect the external
border of Schengen, as well as stated that the burden of asylum applications was
problematic for Hungary:
The German Chancellor and Austrian Chancellor said clearly: nobody can
leave Hungary without being registered. So that is the regulation. We have
to register everybody. We can’t let anybody from Hungary to go to Austria,
to Germany, without being registered. So it’s not strategy, its slow
enforcement.127
In the same press conference, he referred to the whole situation as a ‘German
problem,’ reminding the press that it was the Germans who promised policies like
quota systems and de facto opened the whole of Europe to migration. Hungary

126. “Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June
2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a
third-country national or a stateless person,” Official Journal of the European Union L180 (2013):
31-59.
127. Ian Traynor, “Migration crisis: Hungary PM says Europe in grip of madness,” The Guardian,
last modified September 3, 2015.
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was just one of several culturally conservative former communist countries and
their governments who acted subversively against the requests of the EU and its
most powerful members.
The enormity of the European Migrant-Refugee crisis aggravated
Eurosceptics and gave a breath of fresh political air for populists to assemble
against EU and national institutions. Particularly in Germany, it enabled the
Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD), a political party that was already critical of
Merkel’s handling of the Eurozone crisis, to assume more hardline stances on
culture and immigration issues. The departure of Bernd Lucke from the party in
2015 indicated the party’s shift from a moderate, conservative, anti-Euro platform
to radical, nationalist right-wing politics and anti-Islam activism.128 In a similar
process, the AfD’s dominant voter base shifted from disenchanted conservatives
in the West to politically dispossessed voters in the East. Conservative-leaning
East Germans who had previously remembered the CDU as arbiters of the
reunification process soon found themselves at odds with their tendencies to
form grand coalitions and moving toward the political center. Even under the
indecisive leadership of Frauke Petry and Jörg Meuthen and party infighting, the
AfD managed to produce key electoral breakthroughs in 2015 and 2016 that
rattled German politics, long thought to be the most stable out of all postwar
democracies.

128. “German AfD founder leaves party decrying xenophobic shift,” Reuters, last modified July 8,
2015.
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What was to be done about the incoming migrants and refugees? If the
political pressure was not enough, it was the sheer humanitarian issue of people
putting their lives in the hands of human traffickers to makes that dangerous
journey across the Mediterranean Sea. To the European Union’s credit, the
Council managed to find a diplomatic solution in the Eastern Mediterranean in
March 2016, and in the Central Mediterranean later on in 2017.129 Negotiations
with Turkey resulted in essentially EU access for Turkish nationals and EU
money for refugee settlements in Turkey in exchange for drastically enforcing
controls on their land and sea borders with the EU.130 This settlement, while
having some criticism from EU members, solved the immediate crisis of human
trafficking and related deaths, as well as relieved some of the pressures put on
Frontex and their affiliates in the Aegean.
No matter the attempts to solve the external border crisis, the political
damage had already been done by the beginning of 2016. Eurosceptics and
populists took advantage of the situation by intensifying their rhetoric against the
‘establishment’ and in the direction of migrants and refugees. While here it was
not discussed, ISIS-inspired terrorism gripped the continent and added a
complex layer to the crisis. It was an unfortunate situation that groups like Daesh
simultaneously forced people from their lands and radicalized European

129. A similar agreement was reached in March 2017 with Libyan authorities, known as the Malta
Declaration. From the Frontex data, it appears it has worked to help stop the flow in the Central
Mediterranean. Even so, as this thesis is being written the crisis continues and illegal crossings
have grown substantially in the Western Mediterranean from 2016 onward.
130. “EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016,” Council of the European Union, last accessed 5
April 2019.
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nationals. In particular, the terrorist attack against French satirical magazine
Charlie Hebdo in 2015 stood out as the most symbolic of the European struggle
between religious tolerance and freedom of speech; and the debate on how
precisely to maintain a secure society. Ultimately the issue of immigration,
migration, and secure borders dominated in political campaigns across Europe.
Perhaps the most significant political campaign in all of postwar Europe took
place in the United Kingdom – the campaign to leave the European Union.

Hyperdemocracy and the Road to Brexit
There is much to be said about Brexit, the colloquial expression used to
describe the Britain’s exit from the European Union (or the related 2016
referendum). The amplified visibility of news coverage on British politics since the
referendum is arguably equivalent to the amount of academic literature published
on the referendum. It would be an understatement to pronounce that the
referendum on EU membership was a watershed moment. Brexit is a decisive
issue in European politics. This thesis takes the position that Brexit could have
only happened in light of the problems discussed throughout the preceding
sections and chapters. In particular, the Eurozone crisis and European MigrantRefugee Crisis had a significant impact on British politics. However, those
problems alone are not sufficient for that conclusion. In truth, Brexit was the
culmination of a perfect storm of the long-term factors discussed briefly in
Chapter One and short-term factors emphasized in this section on the backdrop
of the issues discussed in the thesis as a whole.
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For some years, Brexit and the course of contemporary British politics was
je ne sais quoi. The phenomenon was difficult to describe because nothing
equally comparable to it had occurred in the past. In reality, the roadmap for
understanding Brexit, or at least its ‘cognitive’ place in politics, was already
existent. The theoretical discussion of ‘hyperdemocracy’ raised by British political
theorist Stephen Welch provides the missing link. Hyperdemocracy, or as Welch
defines it, is the intensification of democracy.131 The mechanisms of democracy
become democratized themselves, and every level of society itself becomes
afflicted by politics.132 In the case of Brexit, the referendum took a central, wellmarinated issue in British politics and allowed the electorate to supposedly ‘once
and for all’ determine their country’s relationship with the EU.
How can hyperdemocracy be illustrated through Brexit? Intensification of
democracy does not necessarily mean more elections, but in the case of Brexit,
the related issues – namely issues surrounding immigration and national
sovereignty – took center stage across multiple elections. Specifically, the issue
was most intense in the 2014 European Parliament elections and 2015 general
election, both of which were instrumental in conducting a referendum. The 2014
European Parliament elections, as discussed at great length in this thesis,
resulted in the most Eurosceptic European Parliament to date. In Britain, the
rejectionist Eurosceptic, right-wing UK Independence Party (UKIP) led by

131. Stephen Welch, Hyperdemocracy, (New York: Palgrave McMillian, 2013), 1-4.
132. In many ways, hyperdemocracy questionably gives credence to the idea of the late
controversial right-wing U.S. political commentator Andrew Breitbart that “politics is downstream
from culture.”
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populist juggernaut Nigel Farage won these elections with a plurality of votes and
thus, held the largest number of British seats in the European Parliament. Rather
than focusing who should represent Britain at the European level, the election
was quite literally a debate on ‘in’ or ‘out,’ as characterized by the BBC and LBC
debates between Farage and then-Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg of the
Liberal Democrats. While being a highly divisive political figure, Farage came out
on top in these key debates and the election result reflected this. The low turnout
2014 election nevertheless became a powerful ‘strategic’ vehicle for the mostly
Eurosceptic electorate to express their frustrations with British politics.133
The year 2014 represented a fundamental shift in British politics and
indicated that a referendum on EU membership was a convincing possibility at
that moment. For a lack of a better term, the 2014 elections ‘spooked’ the British
Conservatives led by David Cameron. Under the leadership of Cameron, the
party consistently attempted to project an image favorable to the young, middleclass, urban dwellers while quieting the concerns of hardline, Eurosceptic
backbenchers represented by the European Research Group (ERG). Pressure
from this minority within the Conservatives resulted in Cameron giving his
infamous Bloomberg speech in 2013 where promises were made to renegotiate

133. Prior research suggests that European Parliament elections in the United Kingdom allow
politically frustrated voters to vent their displeasure with the political establishment, as the
election results do not have severe repercussions in the domestic arena of politics. See Robert
Ford, Matthew J. Goodwin, and David Cutts, "Strategic Eurosceptics and Polite Xenophobes:
Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament
Elections," European Journal of Political Research 51, no. 2 (2012): 208.

92

Britain’s place in the EU and a referendum on membership itself.134 While this
speech satisfied the likes of the ERG, it had virtually no effect on relieving the
pressure from UKIP and Farage the following year. David Cameron had the
impossible task of maintaining his party’s place in government, sans Liberal
Democrats, in the leadup to the 2015 General Election.
Luckily for David Cameron and the Conservatives, no such electoral
catastrophe occurred in the 2015 election. Despite having only 37% of the
popular vote, the convoluted, constituency-restricted electoral system in the
United Kingdom produced a majority Conservative government to the surprise of
the pollsters and media. Even with the rise of UKIP and perceived weakness on
the campaign’s dominance of issues of concern to the political right, Cameron
was able to produce a victory for his party. The 2015 result guaranteed that
Cameron was able to fulfill his promises in the 2013 Bloomberg speech and
suppress the concerns of the Eurosceptic members of his party. The same year,
the British Parliament passed the European Union Referendum Act 2015 and a
referendum became legally required beginning in early 2016.135 The referendum
on membership was supposed to complement Cameron’s negotiations with the
EU, under the assumption that the result would be in favor of remain. In a
February 2016 speech, Cameron announced that the referendum would take

134. David Cameron, “EU speech at Bloomberg,” Government of the United Kingdom, last
modified January 23, 2013.
135. “European Union Referendum Act 2015,” Government of the United Kingdom, published
December 2015.
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place on June 23, 2016 and confirmed that he would support to Remain a
member of a ‘reformed’ European Union.136
Brexit transcended normal politics, both from the political baggage that
came with the issue and from technological developments in political
campaigning and communication. A train of endorsements lined up behind the
Remain and Leave campaigns. Rather than being confined to media outlets and
newspapers, endorsements came to encompass corporations, businesses,
academia, international figures, and so on. Populism fed into this, enabling Nigel
Farage, Boris Johnson, and similar political figures to condemn alarmist
endorsements on the Remain, establishment-oriented side as ‘Project Fear,’ a
term borrowed from the Yes Scotland campaign from the failed 2014 Scottish
independence referendum. Regardless of their characterizations, Brexit was
definitively a precarious exercise of democracy. Equally, Brexit is not as simple
as supporting a certain political party or politician, it is inherently kaleidoscopic.
By the time of the referendum in 2016, radical change in how an individual
interacted with politics on a daily basis reflected the multivariate, complexity of
Brexit politics. The social media phenomenon, not just in politics but in larger
socio-cultural situations, significantly alters the cognitive perceptions of its users.
Social media allows the individual to perceive that they have a complete grasp
over politics, when it is merely a façade orchestrated by user bias or the

136. Rowena Mason, Nicholas Watt, Ian Traynor, and Jennifer Rankin, “EU referendum to take
place on 23 June, David Cameron confirms,” The Guardian, last modified February 20, 2016.
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‘Algorithm.’ In the sphere of social media, politics happens instantaneously
between its users and never, ever ceases. Traditional media outlets are weighed
down in that they are limited by program scheduling in the case of television, or a
writer has to construct an article, and have it published in the case of
newspapers. Thus, social media can be easily manipulated by politically-oriented
actors and operatives to disseminate information (or misinformation) to the users.
United Kingdom membership in the EU can be deemed as the mother of
all questions in postwar European politics, perhaps surpassing German
reunification. It is unlikely that one referendum would be able to grasp this loaded
question, but that is precisely how the campaign was conducted on all sides. The
campaign focused scrupulously on the why but left the how virtually unknown
until after the referendum. Hyperdemocracy explains that the intensification of
democracy is unsustainable – democracy undermines itself. In this respect, a
single question in one referendum is not able to fulfill its intended democratic
objective. The narrow 52-48 (Leave to Remain) result of the referendum is for all
intents and purposes split right down the middle; neither side could honestly say
that they had decisively won. Not only is this the case, but it is unclear if it is
politically possible for a government that officially supported Remain to support
the Leave result of the referendum in good faith.
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CONCLUSION
The trajectory of the European Union is about as open-ended as the
project itself. As long as the political core of France and Germany remains
committed to the project, as they did in the immediate years after World War II, it
is apparent that the EU will continue to be a powerful force in Europe for decades
to come. Decades of progress shown by various treaties and cooperative
endeavors have bound the continent in theory; thus, in this respect, it would take
an equal or greater amount of time to unwind the project in the same, slow,
peaceful, and diplomatic manner. The symbolic renewal of ties in 2019 between
France and Germany, led respectively by President Emmanuel Macron and
Chancellor Angela Merkel, may endure as only a symbolic gesture. President
Macron, a self-styled pro-Europe centrist, is deeply unpopular with the French
people, who only elected him to office in 2017 to prevent an even less-palatable
Le Pen presidency. It is not out of the realm of possibilities that he will join his
predecessors Sarkozy and Hollande as a one-term President. Chancellor
Merkel, who has maintained standing for being the most powerful politician in
Europe for more than a decade, announced that she would leave German politics
at the end of her term in 2021. It is unclear if she will leave all politics or accept a
high-level position in the EU. Nevertheless, her departure and Macron’s low
approval ratings (coupled with the Gilets Jaunes protests in France), leaves more
questions than answers on who will definitively lead Europe into the 2020s.
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Economics played a key role in exposing underlying variations between
EU member states. While the Greek economy has significantly improved since
the lowest point of their depression, unemployment has not returned to pre-2008
levels. Many Greeks have given up on politics or left the country, and the Greek
government still holds a mountain of debt. The far-left government led by
SYRIZA, while campaigning in 2015 on an anti-austerity platform, has largely
broken its campaign assurances to show restraint in accepting loans backed by
austerity measures. It is easy to participate in the ‘what-if’ game with Greece, but
it is troubling to imagine what would occur if the global economy stalled with
circumstances similar to 2008. Furthermore, the 2008 financial crisis also created
conditions that have allowed so-called cryptocurrencies to flourish in use as
skepticism toward national banks and currencies intensifies. Growth in ecommerce and economic globalization have rendered physical iterations of
currencies less relevant, which threatens some of the optimism that the creators
of the Euro had in trying to craft a European identity through a monetary union.
The Euro is a continual reminder of European cooperation and European
citizenship but has the corresponding ability to cultivate resentment toward
ambiguous European institutions when the economy is not doing well.
Putin’s strategy in the Ukraine has been a success, far surpassing the
geopolitical advances originally made in Georgia. Russian-backed separatists in
the Donbas alone has created enough ambiguity related to Ukraine’s sovereignty
that NATO accession carries more risk than before. Perhaps the largest
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disadvantage for Ukraine is the loss of control over the Crimean Peninsula, which
now functions as Russia’s guaranteed dominance over the Black Sea.
Additionally, Putin’s multifaceted Special War has taken on new frontiers.
Russian-backed exploitation of largely unregulated Internet-based and social
media platforms has assisted in manipulating political discourse and intensifying
the politics of Western liberal democracies. While foreign interference in elections
is recognized by most observers and politicians to be problematic, evidence of
how effective online propaganda and misinformation is in actually altering voting
intentions of the electorate in the overall, complex political discourse remains
inconclusive.
Populists will continue to remain prominent in European politics and alter
political landscapes. Some observers toward the end of 2016 suggested that
populism was a passing phase; that soon Europe would be able to return back to
relative political stability seen in the early 2000s. Nothing could be further from
the truth. Look no further than the course that Brexit has taken in the United
Kingdom since 2016. Brexit has inarguably defined the second half of the 2010s,
possibly even the whole decade. The United Kingdom was poised to officially
leave the European Union on March 29, 2019 in compliance with the provisions
in the now-famous initiation of Article 50. However, this did not happen. Prime
Minister David Cameron’s successor Theresa May negotiated a withdrawal
agreement with the EU but catastrophically failed in securing a majority that
would see its approval. Thus, the United Kingdom was not able to leave on time.
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Also problematic was Prime Minster May’s minority Conservative government
elected in a 2017 snap election that not just included hardliners within her own
party, but the Eurosceptic, British Unionist, and Northern Ireland based
Democratic Unionist Party. The specific issue that ostensibly killed the withdrawal
agreement upon its disclosure in late 2018 was related to the so-called Irish
backstop, a provision that would keep Northern Ireland within the EU Customs
Union if a solution was not made to avoid a hard border between Ireland and
Northern Ireland. Eurosceptics within the Conservatives in addition to the whole
DUP delegation, predictably did not accept May’s agreement. In many respects,
the weak negotiating position held by Cameron before the referendum has
intensified under May. In order to avoid a ‘no-deal’ Brexit, an extension (two of
them, at this point in time) was made to Article 50 to October 2019. May’s failure
to deliver any Brexit, a key 2017 campaign promise that explicitly mentioned the
March 2019 deadline, effectively wiped out support for her Conservative
government and has miraculously resurrected the political life of Nigel Farage
under his new ‘Brexit Party.’ A scenario that the March 2019 deadline was
supposed to prevent, the United Kingdom is likely to participate in European
elections in May 2019, with Farage’s tightly-run, single-issue Brexit Party
receiving high levels of support from disillusioned Brexit supporters.
The complications related to Brexit underscores the complexion of the
greater political zeitgeist in contemporary European politics. When traditional
politics is unable to solve a particular crisis, the sole act of keeping power from
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radicals and populists by desperately governing from the political center
inadvertently disillusions more of the populace to turn to alternatives. This
strategy, in general terms, has been the playbook of the so-called ‘political
establishment’ in recent years. May’s withdrawal agreement demonstrates the
politically lethal act of trying to please everyone, but eventually pleasing no one.
The challenge for the EU and its members in the years forward will be the
navigation of the shifting political paradigm driven by political alternatives. Brexit
negotiations under May has confirmed that this strategy does not work.
Ultimately, the long-term political health of the EU, and indeed the whole of the
Western world, will rest upon this very issue of balancing between solving
popular grievances without jeopardizing the foundations of liberal democracy.
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